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Abstract
We study commodity taxation and characterize the Laffer curve, a trade-off between tax rates
and revenue, in noncompetitive markets. Pricing in these markets leads to incomplete tax
pass-through and agents re-optimize their purchase and pricing decisions in response to any
tax change. We use detailed data from Pennsylvania, a state that monopolizes retail sales of
alcoholic beverages, to estimate a model of demand for horizontally differentiated products that
ties consumers’ demographic characteristics to heterogeneous preferences for spirits. We find
that under the state’s current tax policy, spirits are overpriced. Distillers respond to decreases
in the tax rate by increasing wholesale prices, which limits the state’s revenue gain to only 13%
of the incremental tax revenue predicted under the common assumption of perfect competition.
The strategic response of noncompetitive firms to changes in taxation therefore flattens the
Laffer curve significantly.
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1 Introduction
The empirical public economics literature almost exclusively assumes perfect competition when
considering how to set commodity taxes to raise tax revenue with minimal allocative distortions.
In such settings, the amount of tax revenue raised is purely a function of demand and supply
elasticities. At the same time, the industrial organization literature documents the existence of
market power across a wide variety of settings. For example, in homogeneous product industries,
such as cement, transportation costs result in highly localized competition among few firms. Even
in industries with an abundance of competitors, such as beer, horizontal differentiation between
products bestows market power in the part of the product characteristic space where the firm
competes.
In this paper, we study how strategic pricing by firms impacts optimal taxation. Acknowl-
edging the ability of firms to strategically respond to changes in tax policy alters the relationship
between commodity tax rates and the amount of tax revenue generated – the Laffer curve –
derived under perfect competition.1 Why might optimal taxation differ once we recognize that
firms frequently have pricing power? In an oligopoly, firms price at a level where demand is
elastic. If elasticity of demand increases with price, the introduction of a tax entails larger quantity
distortions than in the competitive case. Since oligopolistic firms face downward sloping residual
demands, they have an incentive to revise their pricing decisions in response to a tax, introducing
an additional factor beyond demand and supply elasticities in determining the amount of tax
revenue generated. Such pricing responses, if they are significant, change features of the Laffer
curve so any taxation policy that fails to account for these responses is likely to be ineffective. This
may be particularly true once one allows for the heterogeneous cross-price effects associated with
differentiated products.
We present a theoretical derivation of the Laffer curve that allows for the existence of market
power among taxed firms. We then empirically characterize the determinants of the Laffer curve for
commodity taxes; an important source of government revenue in the U.S. (17.4% of revenue) as well
as in the average developed country (32.7% of revenue).2 Earlier studies of the Laffer curve focus on
competitive general equilibrium effects of labor and capital taxation. For example, Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011) use a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous household preferences to generate
calibrated labor and capital Laffer curves.3
1 Atkinson and Stiglitz (2015) comment on the surprising persistence of the assumption of perfect competition among
firms in the 2015 reprint of their classic textbook on Public Economics: “We went on to emphasize that the model
underlying much of the Lectures —and much of public economics— was the Arrow-Debreu model of competitive
general equilibrium. Looking back a third of a century later, we are struck that little seems to have changed in this
respect.”
2 https://taxfoundation.org/sources-government-revenue-oecd-2016/.
3 Early theoretical works on the Laffer curve include Ireland (1994), Novales and Ruiz (2002), and Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (1997). Empirical efforts at assessing the optimality of labor taxation include Stuart (1981) and Fullerton
(1982) in static contexts, and Pecorino (2011) who allows for hours worked to entail human capital accumulation.
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Our focus on commodity taxation differs from earlier work in two regards. First, we are
able to provide empirical evidence for imperfectly competitive markets in an environment where the
nature of strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms and their response to taxes is likely better
understood than the role of frictions or concentration in either labor or capital markets. Second, we
exploit detailed industry data in estimation, which allows us to generate robust empirical estimates
of consumer demand and firm market power. In contrast, authors who employ sufficient statistics
to study optimal taxation typically abstract from any market power effects (e.g., Auerbach, 1985;
Chetty, 2009; and for contexts similar to ours Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009, and Evans, Ringel
and Stech, 1999).4 The combination of estimated consumer preferences with a model of oligopolistic
pricing allows us to empirically determine tax pass-through rates that reflect not only elasticities
of demand and supply but also changes in markups as taxes change.5 Foreshadowing our results,
allowing both consumers and imperfectly competitive firms to respond to changes in tax policy has
a significant impact on optimal taxation and the characterization of the Laffer curve.
To show that a Laffer curve relationship exists for an imperfectly competitive industry, we
first use a simple model of monopoly taxation to explore the equilibrium interactions between firms
and consumers under alternative levels of the tax rate. We show that raising commodity tax rates
beyond a critical level indeed decreases government revenues under very general demand conditions.
The shape and location of the Laffer curve depend not only on the tax rate and consumer demand
elasticity, but also on the firm’s response to taxation. Moreover, we show that the tax rate and the
firm’s price response are strategic substitutes under most empirically relevant consumer preference
specifications. Therefore, the firm response limits any change in retail price induced by a change
in the tax rate. Effective tax policy thus depends on anticipating the response of the firm to tax
changes – failing to do so would result in the firm’s price response unraveling, at least partially, the
government’s objective.
We evaluate these predictions empirically within the context of Pennsylvania’s taxation of
distilled spirits. The production, distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages is the second largest
beverage industry in the United States (behind soft drinks) and an important source of government
tax revenues. Consequently, the regulation of alcoholic beverages has received considerable atten-
tion beyond our work. Seim and Waldfogel (2013), Aguirregabiria, Ershov and Suzuki (2016), and
Illanes and Moshary (2017) study the effect of entry on prices, spatial competition, and product
offerings in different states. Conlon and Rao (2015) and Miller and Weinberg (2017) evaluate how
alcohol pricing regulations affect collusive behavior by producers.
Motivated by the widespread use of sales taxes to generate government revenue, our analysis
focuses on one particular aspect of optimal commodity taxation: the effect of a common tax rate
4 An exception is Stolper (2016) who studies consumer pass-through of unit gasoline taxes in markets of differing
levels of concentration. The current paper provides the foundation for studying the effect of imperfect competition
on consumer pass-through and tax revenue in environments with ad-valorem taxes.
5 We provide an empirical extension to Weyl and Fabinger (2013) who analyze the impact of imperfect competition
on tax pass-through under several model environments but do not address asymmetric firms with horizontally-
differentiated products.
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for different products on the overall level of tax revenues. Of related interest is Miravete, Seim and
Thurk (2017), where we study the disproportionate incidence on certain firms and consumers of
current uniform taxes relative to optimal subsidy-free product-specific taxes.6
Based on detailed price and quantity data for 2002-2004 across all retail liquor stores in
Pennsylvania, we estimate the response elasticities of both upstream distillers and consumers to the
state’s choice of tax rate. We exploit several notable features of the data. First, in Pennsylvania
the state monopolizes both the wholesale and retail distribution of alcoholic beverages and applies
a pricing rule that translates wholesale prices into retail prices via a single, uniform ad-valorem
tax. Thus, distillers effectively choose retail prices taking into account the tax. Second, as a
product’s retail price is by law common across the state at any point in time, differences in consumer
preferences materialize in differences in product purchases. This allows us to let consumer tastes
vary systematically across products and demographics leading to more flexible substitution patterns
and better estimates of consumer demand and distiller market power. Third, the fact that we
observe both wholesale and retail prices enables us to estimate consumer demand without placing
any restrictions on distiller conduct and market power ex ante. Our estimation therefore admits
the possibility that firms are price-takers and cannot react strategically to changes in policy.
We leverage these features to estimate product-level demand across a variety of consumer
types for 312 products produced by 37 firms. The estimated demand model combined with data
on wholesale prices and a model of oligopoly pricing reveals that upstream firms in the industry
enjoy considerable market power, earning 35 cents in profit for every dollar of revenue. They can
therefore react strategically to changes in the tax rate. We use the estimated equilibrium model to
trace out the Laffer curve under alternative assumptions of firm conduct and behavior. This allows
us to quantify the impact of firm price decisions on the characteristics of the entire Laffer curve
rather than just local deviations from observed behavior.
To illustrate the implications of not accounting for the strategic responses of firms to changes
in tax policy, we compare market equilibria when the state can either perfectly anticipate the
distillers’ response to changes in its taxation policy (a Stackelberg equilibrium) and, alternatively,
when firms do not respond at all to policy changes, our so-called “na¨ıve” equilibrium. To complete
this counterfactual analysis we also evaluate how the optimal response of upstream firms to tax
policy varies with upstream firm market conduct, ranging from single-product pricing to full
collusion, and how such a wholesale pricing response translates into changes in the shape and
position of the Laffer curve.
We show the shape and location of the Laffer curve in our context depends not only
on the interaction of the tax rate and consumers’ downstream product demand responses but
also on upstream market power and firms’ strategic pre-tax price setting. The estimated Laffer
curve for a na¨ıve policymaker is much steeper than for the policymaker who correctly anticipates
6 Similarly, Griffith, O’Connell and Smith (2017) evaluate the use of product-specific corrective taxes to minimize
external health costs from ethanol consumption though they ignore the strategic pricing response of retailers and
firms to changes in taxation.
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price responses, and this is particularly true as conduct among upstream firms becomes more
collusive. Not accounting for price response of taxed upstream firms therefore leads to poor policy
recommendations. For instance, a na¨ıve regulator would have concluded that the state could
increase tax revenues 7.75% (or $28.74 million) by reducing the ad valorem tax from 53.4% to
30.68%. This reduction in the ad valorem tax would have increased profits for all upstream firms
but we show that they could do even better by increasing their wholesale prices by 3.79%, or 34
cents, on average. Thus, the estimated model indicates that upstream prices and the tax rate are
strategic substitutes in oligopoly as predicted by our theoretical model.
While this change in upstream price may appear small, the fact that distillers price on the
elastic region of demand leads to a large change in quantity demanded by consumers. Ultimately,
the firm response enables distillers to convert 87% of the incremental tax revenue into firm profits,
or equivalently the response limits revenue gains to only 12.97% of the forecasted incremental
revenues ($3.73 vs. $28.74 million). It is important to note that this substantial undoing of the
state’s revenue objective requires no coordination among firms. Were distillers instead to collude
in setting wholesale prices the equilibrium effects are worse: in this case we predict that the tax
revenue raised at the na¨ıve tax rate would be 1.36% lower than the amount raised at the current
tax rate.
Alternatively, a regulator attempting to maximize tax revenue and endowed with perfect-
foresight would have predicted the upstream response and instead would only decrease the tax rate
to 39.31%. While the state does manage to increase tax revenue 2.23%, profits among upstream
distillers increase 30.80% as does their share of integrated industry profits (from 29.5% to 34.9%).
The presence of market power among firms therefore flattens the Laffer curve as these taxed firms
strategically respond to convert incremental tax revenue to profits. Moreover, this result extends
to any industry in which firms have market power.
We conclude that na¨ıve tax policy – or wrongly assuming perfectly competitive behavior –
is largely ineffective at increasing tax revenues. This highlights the significance of the policymaker’s
ability to account for the responses of firms and consumers to policies. As such, it underscores the
importance of recent efforts by, for example, the Congressional Budget Office to consider Dynamic
Scoring of new proposed legislation by accounting for the response of firms, workers, and consumers
to changes in government policy; a direct response to the Lucas Critique.
The remainder of paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide a simple model of
taxation under imperfect competition to illustrate the key mechanisms underlying our results.
We then describe the data, the Pennsylvania pricing rule, the upstream distillery market, and
consumption patterns across demographic groups in Section 3. Section 4 contains an equilibrium
discrete choice model of demand for horizontally differentiated spirits. The model incorporates
the features of the current pricing regulations while allowing for (but not imposing) imperfect
competition in the upstream distillery market. In Section 5 we discuss the estimation procedure
and results that benefit from unique features of our data in identifying rich substitution patterns
across products. We also show how we use the estimated model to infer upstream market power
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among distillers. In Section 6 we rely on the estimated demand model and alternative models of
upstream conduct to show that this market power has significant implications for the shape and
location of the Laffer curve. We conclude in Section 7. In the Appendices, we describe additional
data sources, descriptive statistics, robustness of demand estimates, and other results.
2 A Simple Model of the Laffer Curve Under Market Power
We begin by presenting a simple model of monopoly excise taxation. Our goal is to illustrate how
a tax authority’s choice of tax rate affects the tax revenue it generates when allowing for optimal
price responses by taxed firms to changes in policy. Consider the case where a monopoly firm
supplies a single product at a constant marginal cost c. The monopolist chooses the pre-tax price,
which we denote by pw representing the wholesale price in our empirical context, for a given tax
rate τ ≥ 0. The pre-tax price, together with the chosen tax rate, implies a tax-inclusive retail price,
pr, of:
pr = (1 + τ)pw . (1)
The monopolist then chooses pw to maximize profits Π(pw) = (pw − c)D(pr), given consumer
demand D(pr) at the tax-inclusive price, which requires:
D(pr) + (pw − c)D′(pr)(1 + τ) = 0 , (2)
or equivalently, in terms of the Lerner index,
pw − c
pw
=
−D(pr)
D′(pr)(1 + τ)
· 1 + τ
pr
=
−1
ε(pr)
. (3)
This standard inverse-elasticity pricing rule relates the pre-tax (wholesale) markup of the
monopolist to the inverse of the demand elasticity evaluated at the tax-inclusive (retail) price. The
monopolist thus sets pw so that at the tax-inclusive price, demand is elastic.
To characterize the monopolist’s optimal price response to a change in tax policy, we make
use of the retail price definition in equation (1) and totally differentiate the first order condition in
equation (2) with respect to pw and τ to obtain:
dpw
dτ
=
−1
1 + τ
· (2p
w − c)D′(pr) + pr(pw − c)D′′(pr)
2D′(pr) + (pw − c)(1 + τ)D′′(pr) . (4)
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For convenience we define η(τ) as the elasticity of the monopolist’s optimal pre-tax price
to a change in the tax rate τ . Using the inverse-elasticity rule (3), the firm’s optimal response
elasticity is
η(τ) ≡ dp
w
dτ
· τ
pw
=
−1
1 + τ
·
(
pw − pwε(pr)
)
D′(pr)− pw×prε(pr) D′′(pr)
2D′(pr)− prε(pr)D′′(pr)
· τ
pw
, or
η(τ) =
−τ
1 + τ
·
(
1− 1ε(pr)
)
− κ(pr)
2− κ(pr) , (5)
where the key element that determines the sign of η(τ) is κ(pr), the curvature of demand given by
κ(pr) =
D′′(pr)D(pr)
[D′(pr)]2
. (6)
At optimal prices when ε(pr) < −1, the response elasticity η(τ) is negative for linear or
concave demand since D′′(pr) ≤ 0 ensures that κ(pr) ≤ 0. While linear demand is commonly
used for algebraic convenience, theoretical models frequently rely on concave demand (Tirole, 1989,
§1.1). The strategic substitutability of pw and τ arises for other demand systems more broadly.
For instance, equation (5) indicates that η(τ) is negative when κ(pr) ∈ [0, 1) and the monopolist
prices on the elastic region of demand. The curvature condition of κ(pr) < 1 describes the class of
log-concave demand functions, including both concave and somewhat convex demand functions.7
Even for demand systems with higher curvature, with κ(pr) ∈ [1, 2), it is possible for η(τ) to be
negative, depending on the relative magnitudes of
(
1−ε(pr)−1) and κ(pr).8 Isoelastic demand which
is common feature of consumer demand models in the macroeconomic literature (e.g., Dixit-Stiglitz
CES preferences) is a limiting case where κ(pr) =
(
1 − ε(pr)−1) and thus η(τ) = 0. In this case
firms (by assumption) do not alter their pricing decisions in response to changes in tax policy.
As log-concavity characterizes the majority of demand specifications commonly used in economic
analysis, however, we focus on demand systems with κ(pr) < 1 going forward. This includes the
empirically relevant discrete choice models of demand based on Type I extreme value distributed
errors that we rely on in our empirical analysis below (see Fabinger and Weyl, 2016, Appendix 3).
Having established the interaction between the monopolist’s price and the tax rate, we now
explore how the retail price paid by the consumer and tax revenue vary with the tax rate τ . To
highlight the role of the firm response in these relationships, we contrast outcomes under a fixed
and under an optimally chosen wholesale price pw. Consider first the tax elasticity of the retail
price, which we denote by ψ(τ), with ψ(τ) ≡ dprdτ · τpr . Relying on the dependency of the retail price
7 If κ(pr) < 1, it follows from the definition of curvature that D′′(pr)D(pr) − [D′(pr)]2 < 0, which is the condition
for demand to be log-concave.
8 We restrict attention to demand systems with κ < 2 since κ(pr) ∈ [0, 2) ensures that the revenue function R(pr) =
prD(pr) is concave in pr, or equivalently, that the marginal revenue function is decreasing, a common demand
restriction in models of imperfect competition.
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on the tax rate in equation (1) and the wholesale price response in equation (4), the tax elasticity
of the retail price is given by:
ψ(τ) =
τ
1 + τ
+ η(τ) . (7)
The firm’s incentive to reduce price as the tax rate rises thus reduces the retail price
responsiveness to tax rate changes relative to the case where wholesale price does not respond.
This results in a more muted quantity response by the consumer, highlighting the firm’s ability to
affect tax revenue receipts through its price choice.
The government’s tax revenue function is given by
T (τ) = (pr − pw)D(pr) = τpwD((1 + τ)pw) , (8)
and the effect of a change in the tax rate on tax revenue is
dT (τ)
dτ
= pwD(pr) + τpwD′(pr)pw +
dpw
dτ
(
τD(pr) + τpwD′(pr)(1 + τ)
)
= pwD(pr)
[(
1 +
τ
1 + τ
ε(pr)
)
+ η(τ)
(
1 + ε(pr)
)]
. (9)
Tax revenue is thus not monotonic in the tax rate; the sign of dT (τ)/dτ depends on the
relative magnitudes of the tax rate, the equilibrium demand elasticity ε(pr), and the equilibrium
pre-tax price response elasticity η(τ). Certain tax rates fall into what Arthur Laffer called the
“Prohibitive Range,” when an increase in the tax rate leads to a reduction in tax revenue. dT (τ)/dτ
is negative when:
dT (τ)
dτ
< 0 ⇐⇒ 1 + τ
1 + τ
ε(pr) + η(τ)
(
1 + ε(pr)
)
< 0 . (10)
Equation (10) highlights that when – akin to perfect competition – the pre-tax price pw is
fixed and η(τ) = 0, being in the prohibitive range of the Laffer curve requires a sufficiently elastic
consumer demand at the tax-inclusive equilibrium price:
ε(pr(τ)) < ε◦(τ) = −1 + τ
τ
. (11)
For instance, for a tax rate of 50% (similar to the 53.4% tax charged in Pennsylvania) to be in the
prohibitive region of the Laffer curve, the demand elasticity ε(pr) at the corresponding equilibrium
tax-inclusive price needs to be below ε◦(0.5) = −3. For many more moderate taxation schemes,
such as sales taxes, which in the U.S. reached only 9.45% across states in 2015,9 demand for the
affected products is unlikely to be sufficiently elastic for the observed tax rates to be near or beyond
9 See https://taxfoundation.org/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2015/.
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the peak of the Laffer curve; the critical value for the demand elasticity is −11 when τ = 10%.
This elasticity-based mechanism for the Laffer curve in the absence of a strategic supply response
resembles the incentive mechanism relied on in the macro literature to generate a Laffer curve:
higher income taxes reduce workers’ labor supply to eventually sufficiently reduce the labor tax
base for income tax revenues to fall. See Trabandt and Uhlig (2011, Proposition 2).
Consider now the more realistic case where the monopolist re-optimizes its pricing decision
after a change of the tax rate. Substituting (5) for η(τ) in condition (10), the prohibitive range of
the Laffer curve arises when
2− κ(pr) + 2τ
τ
+ ε(pr) +
1
ε(pr)
< 0 . (12)
For this inequality to hold over the elastic range of demand where the monopolist prices, it suffices
that
ε(pr) < ε?(τ, κ) = −2− κ(p
r) + τ
τ
. (13)
How does the implicit relationship between the tax rate and the elasticity of demand
described by equation (13) compare to the case when η(τ) = 0? When demand is log-concave
and κ(pr) ∈ [0, 1), as in our empirical setting, we can show that for any given tax rate τ :
ε?(τ, κ) = −2− κ(p
r) + τ
τ
< −1 + τ
τ
= ε◦(τ) . (14)
When allowing for a strategic response by the monopolist to chosen tax rates, demand at
tax-inclusive retail prices thus needs to be more elastic than under fixed wholesale prices for a tax
rate increase to push tax revenues down the slippery slope of the Laffer curve. For example, for
the above tax rate of 50% to be in the prohibitive region, the demand elasticity at the resulting
tax-inclusive prices now needs to be less than −5 or −4 for κ(τ) equal to 0 or 0.5, respectively.
This compares to the above critical value for the elasticity of −3 when η(τ) = 0. For a given tax
rate, the difference between the two elasticity cutoff values converges to zero as demand becomes
more convex, reflecting that ε?(τ, κ)→ ε◦(τ) as κ(pr)→ 1; it is highest when demand is linear and
κ(pr) = 0.
This result also implies that the tax revenue maximizing tax rate may be higher when
accounting for the reduction in pre-tax price by the monopolist than when the pre-tax price does not
adjust. Expressing equation (14) in terms of the optimal tax rate given the demand responsiveness
at the tax-inclusive prices results in
τ?(ε, κ) = −2− κ(p
r)
1 + ε(pr)
> − 1
1 + ε(pr)
= τ˜◦(ε(pr)) . (15)
Note that τ˜◦(ε) is not necessarily equal to τ◦(ε), the optimal tax rate with fixed pw, since
the demand elasticities are evaluated at different tax-inclusive retail prices, pr = (1 + τ?)pw when
pw responds and pr = (1 + τ◦)pw with fixed pw. Locally, with small changes in the tax-inclusive
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retail price, however, and supported by the empirical evidence we present below, the difference
between τ˜◦(ε) and τ◦(ε) is sufficiently small that τ?(ε, κ) > τ◦(ε(pr)).
Moving from the case when η(τ) = 0 to one where η(τ) < 0 may not only shift the Laffer
curve to the right, but may also make it flatter. The firm response adds the last term in equation (9),
η(τ)
(
1 + ε(pr)
)
, which is positive because of the strategic substitutability of the tax rate and the
wholesale price, η(τ) < 0. Thus, the stronger the firm response, the flatter the Laffer curve becomes.
In summary, the theoretical model suggests that the downward sloping part of the Laffer
curve arises if demand is sufficiently elastic relative to the tax rate and the tax rate elasticity
of the monopolist’s chosen price. Even in the absence of a price response, there is a role for
empirical analysis in determining the elasticity of demand under alternative tax-inclusive prices
to characterize the tax revenue function. Accounting for the firm’s price response further requires
estimates of firm market power via η(τ). Our analysis of Pennsylvania’s spirit pricing therefore
allows us to empirically assess the equilibrium responses of upstream firms and consumers.
We could extend this analysis to various homogeneous good oligopoly models along the
lines of the framework for analyzing tax incidence put forth in Weyl and Fabinger (2013) though
theoretical results do not exist for the differentiated products we study in our empirical application
(Fabinger and Weyl, 2016, Appendix E). Here, the main challenge lies in the fact that a tax rate
increase leads to substitution not only to the outside option, but also to other taxed products; the
resulting overall change in tax revenue reflects varying changes in product sales due to heterogeneity
in products’ costs and characteristics. Further, firms and consumers respond differentially to a tax
rate change based on variation in market power and preferences, respectively. We account for
these effects empirically in characterizing the Laffer curve across all spirits products offered in
Pennsylvania. As in the analysis here, we are particularly interested in comparing the tax revenue
expected by a na¨ıve regulator who mistakenly expects firm prices to remain fixed after a tax
change, η(τ) = 0, to that realized by an agency that correctly anticipates firm responses to its
actions, η(τ) < 0.
3 PLCB Pricing and Sales Data
We now describe our data and the institutional details that inform our theoretical modeling and
econometric specification. Most pertinent are Pennsylvania’s regulations governing retail prices of
spirits products and the frequency and duration of temporary wholesale price adjustments. We also
explore the nature of competition in the upstream distiller market that mitigates the effectiveness
of such pricing regulations. Finally, we document the heterogeneity of consumer preferences for
different types of spirits.
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3.1 Data: Quantities Sold, Prices, and Characteristics of Spirits
We obtained store-level panel data from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) under
the Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law. The data contain daily information from 2002 to 2004 on
quantities sold and gross receipts at the UPC and store level for all spirits and wines, together with
each product’s wholesale price according to well-defined pricing periods.10
As of January 2003, the PLCB operated a system of 593 state-run retail stores across the
state.11 We drop wholesale and outlet stores and combine sales of stores in the same zip code,
resulting in a total of 456 local markets. We link store locations with data on local population and
demographic characteristics using the 2000 Census. The PLCB opened and closed several stores
over the time period of our sample. We take these entry/exit decisions as exogenous shifts in the
demographic composition of the potential pool of each store’s consumers.12
Each store carries a multitude of products. We focus on the spirits category as it represents
the majority of PLCB sales at 60.8% of system revenue. Spirits further constitute a well-defined
and mature product category with a small number of easily measurable product characteristics,
including the type of spirit, the alcohol content, the possible addition of fruit or other flavors, and
the product’s country of origin.13
We restrict our sample to 375 ml, 750 ml, and 1.75 L bottles of spirits products, representing
80.9% of total spirit category sales by volume and 91.6% by revenue. Many of these products are
available across stores but are rarely purchased. We therefore only include the highest selling
products that together account for 80% of sales in each bottle size and spirit type category.
Consequently, a popular 750 ml bottle of E&J Brandy (average retail price of $9.95) is in our
final sample, while a rare 750 ml bottle Remy Martin Louis XIII Cognac (average retail price of
$1,078) is not.14 We also exclude tequila as a segment, as it accounts for less than 2% of sales.
Together, these two restrictions allow us to drop a total of 1,240 products from our sample. Our
final sample consists of 3,377,659 observations of market and time-period level purchases of 312
products that span brandy, cordials, gin, rum, vodka, and whiskey for three bottle sizes. The
final sample represents 56.8% and 63.2% of total bottle sales and spirits revenue from off-premise
consumption outside of a restaurant or bar, respectively.
10Pennsylvania allows for the controlled entry of private retailers in the the sale of beer.
11See Seim and Waldfogel (2013) for an account of the welfare losses induced by the limited store entry allowed in
the Pennsylvania market.
12Appendix A describes how we construct demographic variables based on assigning Census block groups to their
closest store and how we deal with store openings and closings. We also document that the large majority of spirits
are sold at every store. This alleviates concerns about assortment differences between stores leading to potential
competition for consumers between stores.
13 In contrast, wines have hard-to-measure quality determinants and a large number of products with limited life
cycles leading to tiny, highly volatile market shares. For example, within the popular 750 ml bottle category, the
top-100 selling wines (out of 4,675) constitute only 45% of total 750 ml wine revenue.
14Similarly, a 375 ml bottle of Captain Morgan could be excluded from the sample if its sales rank among 375 ml
bottles is too low while other bottle sizes of Captain Morgan are included. In practice this did not occur.
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Table I: Product Characteristics by Spirit Type
Products Price Share % Flavored % Imported Proof
By Spirit Type:
brandy 26 14.37 7.24 30.77 26.92 76.15
cordials 62 14.02 13.38 32.26 51.61 55.82
gin 28 15.03 6.91 3.57 28.57 83.42
rum 40 13.61 16.18 10.00 17.50 74.03
vodka 66 16.75 31.88 21.21 40.91 81.60
whiskey 90 16.67 24.41 0.00 58.89 80.98
By Price and Size:
expensive 150 20.30 46.89 12.00 64.67 77.82
cheap 162 10.92 53.11 17.90 22.84 72.46
375 ml 48 8.89 15.19 8.33 47.92 75.10
750 ml 170 14.44 50.20 21.76 44.71 72.95
1.75 L 94 20.56 34.61 6.38 37.23 78.77
all products 312 15.07 100.00 16.30 37.40 75.33
Notes: “Price” is the simple average price between 2002 and 2004 and across products in each category. “Share” is
based on number of bottles sold. “Cheap” (“Expensive”) products are those products whose mean price is below
(above) the mean price of other spirits in the same spirit type and bottle size.
Table I reports the number, prices, and characteristics of products in our sample, both in
aggregate and by type of spirit, which highlight significant product differentiation. The average
proof is 75.33; 37.40% of products are imported; and 16.3% of products contain flavor add-ins.15
Vodkas and whiskeys have significantly larger market shares (31.88% and 24.41%, respectively)
than rum (16.18%), cordials (13.38%), brandy (7.24%), or gin (6.91%). The differences in product
variety within each category mirror the differences in market shares, with only approximately
one half as many brandy and gin varieties as vodkas while 28.9% of the products are whiskeys.
Flavored products are primarily cordials and brandies and to a lesser extent vodkas and rums. We
also see variation in domestic versus imported varieties across spirit types: 58.89% of whiskeys and
51.61% of cordials in our sample are imported, but imported products comprise less than half of the
products of the other spirit types. We complement these product characteristics obtained from the
PLCB with data on spirit product quality from Proof66.com, a company that aggregates spirits
ratings into a single quality score for each rated product. The quality score is largely informative
within, but not across, spirit types, and we therefore do not report it in Table I.
We denote spirits as expensive when their simple averaged price exceeds the mean price of
other spirits of the same type and bottle size. Table I shows that expensive spirits are purchased
nearly as often as cheaper varieties, but are less likely to be flavored or domestically produced and
have higher proof. The 750 ml bottle is the most popular size of product in terms of unit sales
and product variety, accounting for 50.20% of bottles sold and 54.5% of available spirits products,
closely followed by the 1.75 L bottle with a share of 34.61% of bottles sold and 30.1% of available
15 In 16th century England, if a pellet of gunpowder soaked in a spirit could still burn, the spirit was determined to
be “proof” and thus taxed at a higher rate. Gunpowder soaked in rum will ignite only if the alcohol by volume
exceeds 57.15%. To simplify, since 1848 in the U.S., a 100 proof corresponds to a spirit with 50% alcohol by volume
content. See Jensen (2004).
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spirit products. The smallest bottles we consider, those in the 375 ml format, account for 15.2% of
bottles sold and 15.4% of spirit varieties.
Finally, upstream firms produce brands in particular bottle sizes. For instance, our final
sample is composed of 198 brands (e.g., Captain Morgan) but 88 of these brands are available only
in the 750 ml bottle size while 1 and 31 brands come only in the 375 ml and 1.75 L size, respectively.
The remaining 78 brands were offered in several bottle sizes (e.g., Diageo sold Captain Morgan in
375 ml, 750 ml, and 1.75 L sizes).16
3.2 The Mechanics of the Pricing Regulation
The PLCB acts as a monopolist in the retail distribution of wine and spirits; the Pennsylvania
State Legislature exerts regulatory oversight over several aspects of the daily operations of the
stores. Most notably, as per Pennsylvania Liquor Code (47 P.S. §1-101 et seq.) and Pennsylvania
Code Title 40, the legislature imposes a uniform pricing formula with a constant wholesale price
markup that the PLCB applies both across products and across stores. Prices of spirits are thus
identical across the state at a point in time and follow a common pricing/taxation rule known to
all consumers and upstream manufacturers.
The legislature has modified this rule only infrequently over the years. From 1937 until 1980,
the retail price for all products reflected a 55% markup over wholesale cost for all gins and whiskeys
and a 60% markup for other spirits. In 1980, the legislature reduced the markup to 25% for all
products, but introduced a per-unit handling fee, the Logistics, Transportation, and Merchandise
Factor (LTMF ), of initially $0.81, rising to $0.85 by 1982. The legislature instituted the current
30% markup in 1993 when it also modified the unit fee to vary by bottle size to better reflect
transportation costs from the PLCB ’s centralized warehouses to the retail stores. The LTMF unit
fee for the 375 ml, 750 ml, and 1.75 L bottles in our sample amounts to $1.05, $1.20, and $1.55,
respectively. For the average product, the LTMF fee accounts for 26.7% of the final retail markup.
In addition, consumers also have to pay an 18% sales tax, the “Johnstown Flood Tax,” on all
liquor purchases.17 Accordingly, the retail price pr of a given product with wholesale price, pw, is
calculated as:18
pr = [pw × 1.30 + LTMF ]× 1.18 . (16)
Of primary concern for this paper is the uniform markup, an ad valorem tax, applied to all products,
amounting to (1.30× 1.18− 1), or 53.4%.
16This pattern is reflected in the raw data as well where 958 of the potential 1, 192 brands were offered only in one
bottle size, usually the 750 ml format. Table B.I in Appendix B provides additional descriptive statistics on the
distribution of spirit prices by type and size of bottle.
17The original 10% tax was instituted in 1936 to provide $41 million for the rebuilding of the flood-ravaged town of
Johnstown. Despite reaching the funding goal after the initial six years, the tax was never repealed, but instead
rose to 15% in 1963 and to 18% in 1968.
18An additional 6% sales tax is then applied to the posted price to generate the final price paid by the consumer.
– 12 –
The PLCB has limited ability to depart from this uniform percent markup rule. It operates
seven outlet stores close to the state borders in an effort to mitigate any border bleed of consumers
who illegally import lower-priced products into Pennsylvania from neighboring states. While these
stores offer wines and spirits at discounted prices, the PLCB remains within the uniform markup
policy by primarily selling products in the outlet stores not found in regular stores, for example
multi-packs or unusual bottle sizes for a particular product. Controlling for these stores has little
qualitative or quantitative effect on our results. Related robustness checks are reported in Appendix
C.2.
The PLCB purchases bottles of spirits directly from upstream distillers at wholesale prices
pw. Because of the legislated pricing formula, retail price pr is driven by the wholesale pricing
decisions pw of the PLCB ’s suppliers and any change in the wholesale price results in a change to
the retail price passed on to consumers.
Wholesale prices can change for only two reasons. First, for most products, distillers can
temporarily modify the wholesale price at set intervals that we denote as “pricing periods”. Such
temporary price changes – generally price reductions – last four or five weeks and typically coincide
with the month of year. The PLCB places some limitations on the frequency of temporary price
changes: distillers can put products on sale up to four times a year, or once per quarter. A product
can thus go on sale for one pricing period, but not for two in a row. Distillers also need to submit
any proposed sale prices to the PLCB at least five months before the start of the promotion.
Second, upstream firms can permanently change the wholesale price of a product, thereby
also changing the reference price for temporary price changes. Permanent price changes typically
take effect at the beginning of the first of four-week long intervals that PLCB accounting rules
employ as subdivisions of quarters. Similar to temporary price reductions, distillers need to request
permanent price increases (but not permanent price decreases, which are effective immediately) with
lead time, by the start of one quarter prior to the desired date of the price increase. The periodicity
of permanent price changes is therefore slightly different from that of temporary price changes. Since
temporary wholesale price changes account for 84.8% of price changes in our sample, we aggregate
daily data on prices and quantity sold to the level of pricing periods, resulting in 34 periods from
2002 to 2004. Note that the delay between the request and effectiveness of either permanent or
temporary price adjustments limits the ability of the distillers to respond to temporary demand
shocks – an issue we revisit when discussing price endogeneity concerns in Section 5. We discuss
the periodicity of the price series further in Appendix A.
Table II presents descriptive statistics for changes in temporary price. First, distillers
temporarily change a product’s price 2.3 times a year on average. While not all products experience
a temporary price change, the majority do; 65.31% of spirits are on sale at least once in a given
year. This is true across spirit types, with distillers changing the price of vodkas, expensive varieties,
and all but the smallest bottles more frequently than the rest. There is also a seasonal pattern
of price changes across spirit types as distillers are more likely to change a product’s price during
the summer and less likely during the winter. Over the holidays, defined as pricing periods that
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Table II: Percent of Products Placed on Sale Over the Year
Spring Summer Fall Winter Holiday Year Times
By Spirit Type:
brandy 30.77 50.00 34.62 26.92 34.62 59.26 2.37
cordials 40.32 48.39 30.65 45.16 43.55 61.29 2.35
gin 46.43 39.29 50.00 39.29 39.29 63.64 2.24
rum 47.50 40.00 50.00 32.50 42.50 57.45 2.12
vodka 50.00 60.61 57.58 39.39 50.00 76.81 2.24
whiskey 58.89 51.11 48.89 42.22 53.33 65.71 2.51
By Price and Size:
expensive 51.33 59.33 50.67 47.33 56.00 75.44 2.22
cheap 45.68 41.36 41.98 32.10 37.65 55.23 2.50
375 ml 14.58 18.75 20.83 8.33 6.25 30.91 1.39
750 ml 50.59 53.53 45.88 46.47 51.18 71.66 2.14
1.75 L 61.70 59.57 59.57 42.55 58.51 72.28 2.91
all products 48.40 50.00 46.15 39.42 46.47 65.31 2.34
Notes: “Cheap” (“Expensive”) products are those products whose mean price is below (above) the mean price of
other spirits in the same spirit type and bottle size. We define the “Holiday” season as the two pricing periods that
encompass Thanksgiving through the end of the year. Statistics reflect the percent of products with a temporary
price reduction during the corresponding season except for “Times,” which denotes the average number of times
that spirits in each category are on sale during a year.
overlap with Thanksgiving through the end of the year, distillers place 46.47% of our spirit products,
ranging from 34.62% of brandies to 53.33% of whiskeys, on sale at least once, but change the price
of 375 ml bottles rarely. The combination of variation in monthly price changes, both temporary
and permanent, and differences in the amount of the price changes is the primary source of price
variation that we exploit in the estimation of our demand model.
3.3 The Upstream Distillers
While the distiller market saw several large mergers post-2004, there were no mergers or acquisi-
tions of relevance in the distiller segment during the sample period and the market is relatively
unconcentrated. Table III shows that the market leader, Diageo, accounted for 21.60% of revenues
and 24.48% of bottle sales in the sample; more than double the size of its two largest competitors
at the time: Bacardi and Beam. Meanwhile, 34 smaller firms collectively hold significant market
share: 59.62% share of revenue and 56.72% of bottle sales.
The largest upstream firms – Diageo, Bacardi, and Beam – operate product portfolios that
extend into all spirit types and bottle sizes while 21 of the 34 smaller distillers operate product
portfolios of less than 5 products and 8 are single product firms. There is, however, substantial
heterogeneity in product offerings even among the top three distillers. For example, Diageo has a
relatively balanced portfolio where rums, vodkas, and whiskeys generate 19.6%, 31.8%, and 24.4% of
its total revenue, respectively. In contrast, 70.2% of Bacardi’s revenue comes from rums compared
to just 4.1% for Beam.19
19Table B.II in Appendix B reports the market shares by spirit type, bottle size, and price range. Bacardi acquired
Grey Goose from Sidney Frank in August 2004. Since PLCB requires a five-month advance notice for any temporary
price reduction, we assume that Sidney Frank manages the brand in our estimation and counterfactuals.
– 14 –
Table III: The Upstream Market
Share of Spirit Market Top Selling Product
Firm Products By Revenue By Quantity Name Type
Diageo 63 21.60 24.48 Captain Morgan Rum
Bacardi 22 8.92 9.79 Bacardi Light Dry Rum
Beam 32 9.86 9.01 Windsor Canadian Whiskey
Other Firms (34) 195 59.62 56.72 SKYY (Campari) Vodka
Notes: Upstream distillers sorted in descending order according to quantity (bottles) share.
While the overall market appears competitive with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
based on bottle sales of only 930.3, distillers have more market power in some regions of the product
space than others. For example, the HHI is approximately 3,000 for rums, while the brandy and gin
segments are moderately concentrated with HHIs around 2,000. The cordial, vodka, and whiskey
segments are the most competitive with low concentration measures (all less than 1,400). Horizontal
differentiation of products within a spirit class would provide further market power. An accurate
characterization of the response of distillers to changes in government tax policy therefore requires
estimation of patterns in consumer preferences that motivate the observed extent of differentiation
across and within these different product segments.
3.4 Evidence of Preference Heterogeneity
To conclude the description of the primary data features, we now document systematic variation
in consumer preferences along different demographic profiles. Throughout the analyses, we rely on
four primary demographic attributes of stores’ market areas: income, educational attainment, and
the prevalence of minority and young consumers. We use categorical data on income by minority
status to fit generalized beta distributions. These allow us to draw random samples of income for
our estimation from market-specific continuous distributions that vary by demographic trait, and
to estimate the share of high-income households (incomes above $50,000). We similarly obtained
information on educational attainment by minority status to derive the share of the minority
and white population with at least some college education in each area. Lastly, we employ the
unconditional share of each market’s population between the ages of 21 and 29.
We show differences in preferences by assigning the store markets into quintiles based on
each demographic trait – the share of high-income households, the share of non-white or minority
households, the share of residents with some college education, and the share of residents in their
twenties. Figure 1 compares the purchase patterns of the top and bottom quintiles. Markets
with a greater share of minorities have substantially higher sales of vodka, gin, and brandy but
lower sales of whiskey. In areas where the population has more residents with college experience,
however, not only vodka but also whiskey is more popular, while rum and brandy have lower sales.
In markets with a larger share of high income residents, we observe larger purchases of expensive
spirits indicating that high income consumers are more willing to buy expensive spirits, presumably
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because these spirits tend to be of higher quality.20 Finally, as the share of young residents increases,
so do sales of smaller bottles.
Figure 1: Spirit Consumption and Demographics
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(b) Level of Education and Spirit Type
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Notes: We compare markets in the top (“High”) and bottom (“Low”) quintile of each demographic trait. “Minority” is the
percent of the market population who identifies as “non-white.” “‘Education” is defined as the percent of the population with
some college experience. “Income” is the percent of households with high income, defined as greater than $50,000. “Age” is
the percent of the population between 21 and 29 years of age.
Our analysis exploits this wide variation in observable preferences across demographic
groups in three ways. First, this preference heterogeneity allows us to capture rich substitution
patterns to best reflect the purchase decisions of consumers, leading to more robust elasticity
estimates both across products and for spirits as a whole. This, in turn, results in more accurate
estimates of upstream firm market power and thus, the distillers’ ability to respond to changes in
the downstream tax rate (η(τ) of the model in Section 2). Second, the large amount of heterogeneity
among products and distillers combined with heterogenous consumer preferences suggests that the
upstream response to changes in tax policy will vary by firm and product leading to heterogenous
effects across consumers.
20The Proof66.com data confirm that price and quality are positively correlated, particularly for cordials, gins, and
whiskeys.
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Finally, the wide variation in observed preferences provides us with an opportunity to
explore the characteristics of the Laffer curve, such as location and shape, across consumer segments.
We confirm that an inverted U-shaped curve characterizes the relationship between the tax rate
and tax revenue for any particular demographic group. The statewide Laffer curve we present is
thus not an inadvertent outcome of having aggregated the non-Lafferian responses of heterogeneous
consumers to a change in tax policy.
4 Empirical Model
In this section we describe a static model of oligopoly price competition with differentiated goods.
We assume that each period upstream spirit manufacturers simultaneously choose wholesale prices
(pw) to maximize profits. The downstream firm, the PLCB , takes these prices as given and
generates the final retail price by applying a single markup and a per-unit handling fee that varies
by bottle size. Finally, consumers in each market choose the product that maximizes their utility.
We solve the model backwards, first presenting downstream consumer demand and then progressing
to the profit-maximization problem of the upstream spirit manufacturers.
4.1 Downstream Market - A Discrete Choice Model of Demand for Spirits
In modeling demand for spirits as a function of product characteristics and prices, we follow the
large literature on discrete-choice demand system estimation using aggregate market share data
(e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995 (BLP) and Nevo, 2001). In pricing period t, consumer i
in market l obtains the indirect utility from consuming a bottle of spirit j ∈ Jlt given by
uijlt = xjβ
∗
i + α
∗
i p
r
jt + [ht q3t]γ + ξjlt + ijlt ,
where i = 1, . . . ,Mlt; j = 1, . . . , Jlt; l = 1, . . . , L; t = 1, . . . , T .
(17)
The n × 1 vector of observed product characteristics xj is fixed over time, though the avail-
ability of different products changes over time due to product introductions/removals or store
closings/openings. The holiday dummy variable ht indicates whether period t coincides with the
end-of-year holiday season from Thanksgiving to the New Year, while the summer dummy variable
q3t captures periods which overlap with the months of July, August, and September. We denote
the retail price of product j at time t by prjt; it is constant across markets l at point t. We further
allow utility to vary across products, markets, and time via the time and location-specific product
valuations ξjlt, which are common knowledge to consumers, upstream firms, and the PLCB but
unobserved by the econometrician.21
21Our assumption that firms observe the full distribution of consumer preferences is a simplification to abstract from
second-degree price discrimination within brand by bottle size. Accounting for such information asymmetries would
require a demand model with less flexible substitution patterns than the ones that motivate the observed horizontal
product differentiation.
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We characterize consumer i in market l by a d-vector of observed demographic attributes
Dil including education, race, age, and income. To allow for individual heterogeneity in pur-
chase behavior and alleviate the restrictive substitution patterns generated by the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property of the multinomial logit model, we assume that the
distribution of consumer preferences over product characteristics and prices follows a multivariate
normal distribution: (
α∗i
β∗i
)
=
(
α
β
)
+ ΠDil + Σνil , νil ∼ N(0, In+1) , (18)
where Π is a (n + 1) × d matrix of coefficients that measures the effect of observable individual
attributes on the consumer valuation of spirit characteristics, while Σ measures the covariance in
unobserved preferences across characteristics. We restrict Σjk = 0 ∀k 6= j, and estimate only the
variance in unobserved preferences for characteristics.
We follow Grigolon and Verboven (2014) in assuming that the unobserved individual pref-
erences for products, , are correlated across spirits of the same type. We observe g = 6 distinct
spirit types in the data (brandy, cordials, gin, rum, vodka, and whiskey) and define group zero
to be the outside good. In the resulting random coefficient nested logit model or RCNL, we can
decompose the idiosyncratic valuation into:
ijlt = ζigt + (1− ρ)ijlt , (19)
where the “nesting parameter” ρ ∈ [0, 1],  is distributed i.i.d. multivariate type I extreme value,
and the distribution of ζigt is such that ijlt is also distributed extreme value.
Together, equations (18) and (19) encompass a range of demand specifications. When Σ = 0
and ρ > 0 the model collapses to the nested logit; as ρ approaches one, consumers view products
within each spirit type as perfect substitutes. Alternatively, when ρ = 0 but Σ > 0 the model
collapses to the random coefficients model of BLP . When both Σ = 0 and ρ = 0, the model returns
the simple multinomial logit choice probabilities.
We assume that in each time period, a consumer selects either one bottle of the Jlt spirits
available in her market l or opts to purchase the outside option denoted by j = 0. We define the
potential market, Mlt, as all purchases of alcoholic beverages, including spirits, beer, and wine,
for off-premise consumption.22 According to Haughwout, Lavallee and Castle (2015), the average
drinking-age Pennsylvanian consumed 124.2, 120.5, and 121.0 liters of alcoholic beverages in 2002,
2003, and 2004, respectively, of which off-premise purchases accounted for 79.8%. Beer makes
up 90% of total consumption by volume: the average drinking-age Pennsylvanian consumes the
22Hendel (1999) highlights that the present static discrete choice approach has limitations when individuals purchase
several products or multiple bottles of the same product at the same time. Hendel and Nevo (2006) further show
that static demand estimates overestimate own-price elasticities and underestimate cross-price elasticities when
consumers make dynamic purchase decisions. We discuss potential issues and biases associated with stockpiling in
Appendix C.5 and provide evidence that suggests stockpiling is not an issue in our data.
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equivalent of nearly five 375 ml bottles of beer per week, but only approximately four 750 ml
bottles of wine and spirits during the year. The potential market Mlt for location l in period t is
simply the prorated potential off-premise consumption per-capita based on the length of pricing
period t scaled by the market’s population over the age of 21, and the outside option represents
beer and wine purchases expressed in 750 ml bottle equivalents.
Given these preliminaries, the set of individual-specific characteristics that lead to the
optimal choice of spirit j is given by
Ajt (p
r
·t, x·, ξ·t; θ) = {(Dil, νil, ·lt) |uijlt ≥ uiklt ∀k = 0, 1, . . . , Jlt} , (20)
where we summarize all model parameters by θ. We decompose the deterministic portion of the
consumer’s indirect utility in equation (17) into a common part shared across consumers, δjlt, and
an idiosyncratic component, µijlt:
δjlt = xjβ + αp
r
jt + [ht q3t]γ + ξjlt ,
µijlt = [xj p
r
jt] (ΠDil + Σνil) .
(21)
We take advantage of the additive specification of utility to integrate over the distribution
of it giving rise to Ajt analytically. The probability that consumer i purchases product j in market
l in period t is then
sijlt =
exp
(
δjlt + µijlt
1− ρ
)
exp
(
Iiglt
1− ρ
) × exp(Iiglt)
exp(Iilt)
, (22)
where
Iiglt = (1− ρ) ln
Jg∑
m=1
exp
(
δmlt + µimlt
1− ρ
)
,
Iilt = ln
1 + G∑
g=1
exp(Iiglt)
 .
(23)
Last, to derive product j’s aggregate market share in each location, we integrate over the
distributions of observable and unobservable consumer attributes Dil and νil, denoted by PD(Di)
and Pν(νi), respectively. Thus, the model predicts a market share for product j in market l at time
t of
sjlt =
∫
νl
∫
Dl
sijltdPD(Di)dPν(νi) , (24)
which we evaluate by Monte Carlo simulation using Halton draws from the empirical distribution
of ν. For each market l we simulate the consumption choices of 200 randomly drawn heterogeneous
consumers who vary in their demographics and income according to the empirical distributions
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from the 2000 Census for market l. We exploit the availability of data on the distribution of
income and of educational attainment conditional on minority status in generating demographic
attributes for the simulated set of consumers. Since the ambient population of stores changes with
store openings and closings over the course of the sample, we allow the simulated set of agents to
change accordingly. See Appendix A for further details.
4.2 An Oligopoly Model for Upstream Distillers
Wholesale prices pw are the outcome of an upstream market equilibrium given the PLCB ’s pricing
rule and consumer demand for spirits. We now present a flexible model of upstream behavior that
places few restrictions on firm conduct while allowing for robust estimates of upstream market
power. Each firm f ∈ F produces a subset Jft of the j = 1, . . . , Jt products and faces several
competitors from the set F of distillers. In each period t the upstream firms simultaneously choose
the vector of wholesale prices {pwjt}j∈Jft to maximize period t profit
max
{pwjt}
∑
j∈Jft
(pwjt − cjt)×
L∑
l=1
Mltsjlt
(
pr(pw), x, ξ; θ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
statewide demand for
product j in period t
, (25)
where cjt denotes the marginal cost of producing spirit j in period t. Given the static nature of
the firms’ pricing decisions, we omit the period t subscripts for the sake of clarity going forward.23
Define sj(p
r, x, ξ; θ) =
∑L
l=1Mlsjl(p
r, x, ξ; θ) the state-wide demand for product j. Assuming a
pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in wholesale prices, upstream firm f chooses prices pwj
∀j ∈ Jf to solve the set of first-order conditions
sj
(
pr(pw), x, ξ; θ
)
+
∑
m∈Jf
(pwm − cm)sm
(
pr(pw), x, ξ; θ
)× ∂sm
∂pwj
= 0 . (26)
The term ∂sm∂pwj
is the change in quantity sold for product m in response to a change in the retail
price induced by the wholesale price change, of product j. Rearranging equation (26) yields
pw = c+ [Ow ∗∆w]−1 × s(pr(pw), x, ξ; θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vector of wholesale markups
, (27)
23Table II documents that the average product goes on sale only 2.3 times per year; 76.6% of products go on sale
three times or less in a year. The PLCB ’s limits on temporary price reductions per year thus do not constrain
upstream pricing for the majority of products, and we do not address any dynamic considerations to the timing of
pricing decisions over the course of the year.
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where Owt denotes the ownership matrix for the upstream firms with element (j,m) equal to one if
goods j and m are in Jf . The matrix ∆w captures changes in demand due to changes in wholesale
price:
∆w=∆d∆p′=

∂s1
∂pr1
. . . ∂s1∂prJ
...
. . .
...
∂sJ
∂pr1
. . . ∂sJ∂prJ


dpr1
dpw1
. . .
dpr1
dpwJ
...
. . .
...
dprJ
dpw1
. . .
dprJ
dpwJ

′
=

∂s1
∂pr1
. . . ∂s1∂prJ
...
. . .
...
∂sJ
∂pr1
. . . ∂sJ∂prJ


1.534 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 1.534
. (28)
∆d is the matrix of changes in quantity sold in period t due to changes in retail price with element
(r,m) equal to ∂sr∂prm
. An element (m, j) of ∆p, the matrix of changes in retail price due to changes
in wholesale price, equals dp
r
m
dpwj
.
Villas-Boas (2007) shows that in vertical retail pricing markets, ∆p can be a complicated
object. Here, in contrast, the state’s regulation of alcohol sales simplifies and constrains downstream
price responses significantly. For example, under the current pricing rule,
dprj
dpwj
is simply 1.534, the
uniform markup that translates a change in the wholesale price for product j to a change in the
product’s retail price, and for j 6= m, the retail price for product m does not respond to a change
in the wholesale price for product j, resulting in a diagonal price response matrix ∆p.
We rely on this model of firm behavior in the following ways. First, we use the firms’
first-order conditions in equation (27) to back out product-level marginal costs given demand
estimates and observed wholesale and retail prices. This enables us to measure wholesale markups
and thus the degree of market power in the upstream market. Second, we evaluate the optimal
distiller response to changes in PLCB tax policy, which we denote as η above. Third, the upstream
model allows us to consider alternative forms of upstream conduct, by varying the definition of
the ownership matrix Ow. We exploit this flexibility to explore how different conduct assumptions
impact the upstream response to taxes and the shape and location of the Laffer curve.
5 Estimation, Identification, and Demand Model Results
Our estimation approach follows Nevo (2001) adapted to the institutional features of the Pennsyl-
vania spirits market. We take advantage of the fact that distillers and the PLCB set a single price
per product, which allows us to identify the contribution to demand of heterogeneity in tastes across
the state separately from the contribution of price as a time varying, common, shifters of demand.
We discuss the response of distillers to downstream consumer demand shocks as a potential source
of price endogeneity that threatens identification of the price coefficient. We then present the model
estimates and the implied demand elasticities and upstream response elasticities.
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5.1 Estimating the Random Coefficients and Demographic Interactions
We begin with a description of the first of the three stages of our estimation procedure, in which we
estimate the contributions of unobserved taste heterogeneity Σ and demographic interactions Π to
the deviations from mean utility, µijlt, as well as the nesting parameter ρ, controlling for location
and product-time fixed effects. We employ a generalized method of moments (GMM ) estimator
to estimate these first stage parameters θA = {Σ,Π, ρ} by interacting a structural demand side
error ω(θA) with instruments Z. To define ω, we rewrite each product’s mean utility δjlt from
equation (21) as:
δjlt = xjβ + αp
r
jt + [ht q3t]γ + ξjlt ,
= υl + υjt + ∆ξjlt
(29)
We thus decompose the mean utility into a location fixed effect, a product-time fixed effect,
and deviations thereof, ∆ξjlt. The location fixed effect υl captures systematic variation across
markets in either the preference for spirits relative to beer and wine or in the local preference for
alcoholic beverages in aggregate relative to the Pennsylvania average. In the absence of disaggregate
data on purchases of all alcoholic beverages, we use the Pennsylvania average as the potential market
size for all locations. To capture seasonality and other variation in tastes over time, we include
product-time fixed effects υjt. These fixed effects also reflect the effect of product characteristics,
price, and seasonal buying, xjβ + αpjt + [ht q3t]γ, on a product’s mean utility.
Equation (29) highlights an advantage to our setting: since price does not vary across
locations l, we are able to control for its mean contribution to utility via product-time fixed effects,
which we then use in a second stage estimation to isolate α. The remaining structural error ω
therefore represents deviations in unobserved product valuations within a store, ∆ξjlt, from these
mean product-time valuations after controlling for the average taste for spirits in market l.
We solve for the structural error ω(θA) = ∆ξjlt using the following algorithm. For a given
guess at θA, we find the mean-utility levels δjlt(υl, υjt, Sjlt; θA) that set the predicted market share
of each product, sjlt in equation (24), equal to the market share observed in the data, Sjlt.
24
Following Somaini and Wolak (2015), we use a within transformation of δ to remove the store and
product-time fixed effects υl and υjt, leaving only ω. Define Z
+ as the within transformation of the
instruments matrix Z; e.g., for instrument k, Z+,kjlt = Z
k
jlt−Z
k
jt−Zkl . The GMM estimator exploits
the fact that at the true value of the parameters (Σ?,Π?, ρ?), the instruments Z+ are orthogonal
to the structural errors ω(Σ?,Π?, ρ?), i.e., E
[
Z+
′
ω(θ?)
]
= 0. The GMM estimates solve
θˆA = argmin
θA
{
ω(θA)
′Z+W+Z+
′
ω(θA)
}
, (30)
24We rely on the contraction mapping outlined in Appendix I of BLP and modified for the RCNL model by Grigolon
and Verboven (2014, Appendix A). In order to ensure convergence to consistent stable estimates, we follow the
advice of Dube´, Fox and Su (2012, §4.2) and set the norm for the mean value contraction equal to 1e-14.
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where W+ is the weighting matrix, representing a consistent estimate of E[Z+
′
ωω′Z+].25 Finding
a global solution to such a highly nonlinear problem is difficult. As suggested by Dube´ et al. (2012),
we employ the Knitro Interior/Direct algorithm using several initial conditions to ensure robustness
of our results.
5.1.1 Identification of Random Coefficients and Demographic Interactions
Identification of Σ and ρ comes from correlation between a product’s market share and its charac-
teristics relative to other more or less similar products; see Berry and Haile (2014). We construct
two instruments similar to those used in Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997). First, we
employ the number of products in the market that share product j’s characteristic. For example,
to identify random taste variation for imported products, we count, for a given imported product
sold in market l, the total number of competing imported products of the same bottle size in that
market. Similarly, to identify the nesting parameter, ρ, we use the total number of competing
products of the same spirit type in market l, separately for each spirit type. Second, we use
each product’s quality score and compute the average distance, measured in squared deviations, of
product j to other products that share its characteristic. Thus, for the above imported product, this
would be the average distance in quality scores from other imported products in location l. This
instrument provides additional identifying power since it allows for differential effects of introducing
a high-quality imported product – say a Scotch whiskey – into a market with other high-quality
imported products versus into a market populated by largely low-quality imported products – say
lower quality Canadian whiskeys.
We base identification of Π on correlation between a product’s market share in a given store
market and the demographics of the population served by each store. We thus interact the above
instruments with the prevalence of a given demographic attribute in each market. For example, we
identify the differential taste of young households for vodkas by interacting our earlier instruments
for vodka with the share of young consumers in each market. To identify how the price response
varies with income, we interact the count of competing products that share each focal product’s
price category (cheap vs. expensive) with the share of households in the market with income above
$50,000. These instruments proposed by Waldfogel (2003) are valid if there are no demand spillovers
from consumers in other similar markets.
25We first assume homoscedastic errors and use W+ = [Z+
′
Z+]−1 to derive initial parameter estimates. Given these
estimates, we solve for the structural error ω and construct E[Z+
′
ωω′Z+]−1 as a consistent estimate for W+.
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5.2 Estimating Mean Utility Coefficients
In the second and third stages of estimation, we recover the product-time fixed effects υjt(θˆA)
from the first-stage estimates θˆA. We express υjt as a function of price and seasonal indicators,
controlling for product fixed effects υj ,
υjt = αpjt + [ht q3t]γ + υj + ∆υjt . (31)
Equation (31) highlights the potential for price endogeneity, to the extent that a product’s
price responds to common time-varying preference variation, such as seasonal variation in consump-
tion. Since the PLCB ’s pricing rule applies a fixed markup to wholesale price irrespective of local
or seasonal demand responses, its pricing cannot respond to such unobserved demand shocks. But
the predictable link between wholesale and retail prices opens the possibility to spirit prices being
endogenous not because of the pricing practices of the PLCB but because of the pricing behavior of
upstream distillers whose chosen wholesale prices in equation (27) reflect, through market shares,
the unobserved common tastes for product characteristics of spirits, ∆υjt.
In principle, the fact that distillers need to request both temporary and permanent changes
to their wholesale price a number of months before the new price takes effect mitigates such
endogeneity concerns. Prices thus only respond to predictable variation in a product’s demand
over time. At the same time, none of our product characteristics vary across time, limiting our
ability to flexibly represent such time varying preference heterogeneity at the level of the product.
We therefore use instrumental variables techniques to estimate the parameters in equation (31).
We use two sets of price instruments. First, we rely on the contemporaneous average price of
a given product from liquor control states outside of the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions.26 Our
identifying assumption is that cost shocks are national, since products are often produced in a single
facility, but demand shocks are largely regional, linked to differences in climate and demographics,
which correlate with consumption as we establish in Section 3.4. We thus focus on product prices
in control states that are distant from Pennsylvania and have sufficiently different demographic
profiles and climates to support the assumption that their demand shocks are uncorrelated with
Pennsylvania’s. For example, states such as Idaho, North Carolina, Oregon, and Wyoming have
at least a 50% higher share of Hispanics than Pennsylvania’s low six percent, while only North
Carolina has a significant prevalence of African Americans (at 22% double Pennsylvania’s 11%
share), but also a very different climate. As a result, the appeal of product categories like whiskey
whose consumption peaks during cold months varies significantly between Pennsylvania and the
states used to construct the instrument. Given that most price changes in the data are temporary,
26An “alcohol control state” is a state that has monopoly over the wholesale or retail sales of some or all categories
of alcoholic beverages. As of 2016, this list includes: Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland (Montgomery,
Somerset, and Wicomico counties), Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Washington state privatized its
alcohol retail distribution in 2012.
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rather than permanent, a concern with this instrument would be possible coordination of sales
across the control states. We find little evidence of such coordination, however.27
We add to this instrument changes in the price of major inputs, sugar and corn, interacted
with spirit type indicators to account for exogenous cost changes across spirit types: while a major
input for cordials and rums is sugar, corn is an input to gins, vodkas, and whiskeys. Including
input price interactions for barley, glass, oats, rice, rye, sorghum, and wheat did not change the
estimates.
In the third and final estimation step, we use the estimated product fixed effects υj from
equation (31) and project them onto observable product characteristics xj to isolate systematic
variation in demand by spirit type, proof, and bottle size. Variation in prices over time identifies
the price coefficient, exploiting the fact that distillers do not change the wholesale prices pw for all
products at the same time, which introduces variation in relative prices. We identify seasonality
and mean preferences for time-invariant product characteristics such as proof and spirit type from
systematic variation in market shares of spirits by time period and by characteristic.
5.3 Estimation Results
Table IV presents the demand estimates of our preferred specification of the RCNL model using the
three-step procedure outlined above. The parameters are precisely estimated. Estimated demand
for spirits increases during the summer and the holiday season. On average, consumer valuations
of brandy, cordials, and whiskey exceed gin (our reference category), while rums and vodkas are,
on average, less valued. Consumers prefer 1.75 L to smaller bottles reflecting that when a brand is
available in several bottle sizes, the 1.75 L is more popular, all else equal. Consumers also prefer
imported, flavored, and high proof products.
These are only average valuations. We also allow for rich variation in valuations across
demographic groups by interacting the young, minority, and college-educated indicators with spirit
type, bottle size, and proof. The estimates of Π reveal significant heterogeneity in tastes for
spirits. Demand becomes steeper as consumers become wealthier, consistent with the increased
consumption of expensive spirits by “high income” consumers presented in Figure 1. Consumers
of different demographic groups often do not favor the same spirit types: Although the average
consumer values vodkas less than gins, individuals with some college education strongly favor them,
as they do whiskeys. These consumers also dislike brandy, while minorities rank brandy over gin
and then whiskey. Young consumers have a marked preference for rum and 750 ml bottles.
Despite the large number of demographic interactions included in Π, we still estimate
statistically significant random coefficients (Σ) for proof and 750 ml bottles. We also obtain a
significant estimate of the spirit type nesting parameter ρ, indicating that products within a spirit
27We define a price reduction in our price instruments as “temporary” when price falls for one month. We then test
whether these indicators are correlated with temporary price reductions in Pennsylvania using Kendall’s τ , which
we find to be low (on average 0.03 across state-pairs). This indicates that these temporary price changes do not
appear to be correlated.
– 25 –
Table IV: RCNL Demand Estimates
Mean Utility Random Coeff. Demographic Interactions (Π)
(β) (Σ) Income Young Minority College
price -0.3062 0.1151
(0.0036) (0.0036)
holiday 0.3153
(0.0057)
summer 0.0557
(0.0049)
375 ml -2.9554
(0.5608)
750 ml -7.5816 0.5939 22.7684 0.4025 4.9886
(0.4037) (0.3061) (3.2953) (0.0844) (0.2976)
brandy 0.3882 0.8616 1.3978 -0.8738
(0.6902) (0.2288) (0.0231) (0.0518)
cordials 0.2977
(0.7163)
rum -4.7646 11.5406 -0.1628 0.6795
(0.8355) (2.9485) (0.0146) (0.0426)
vodka -1.9611 4.9747 -0.3713 4.2314
(0.4835) (0.6656) (0.0233) (0.2701)
whiskey 0.3875 1.2203 -0.9270 0.9549
(0.5123) (0.2059) (0.0231) (0.0554)
flavored 3.7007 -4.9731 -0.5111 -3.2395
(0.4848) (0.7219) (0.0374) (0.1943)
imported 1.3598 0.1912
(0.3519) (0.5134)
proof 15.1897 1.2575 -26.0064 1.6695 -5.5765
(1.6844) (0.2505) (4.2377) (0.0913) (0.4402)
quality 3.9347
(2.1101)
constant -15.3884
(1.8244)
Nest (ρ) 0.1225
(0.0139)
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates for random coefficients Σ,
demographic interactions Π, and nesting parameter ρ are based on GMM estimation using 3,377,659
observations in 12,957 markets given by store-period pairs and 200 simulated agents in each market.
Mean utility estimates for price, holiday, and summer are based on the projection of estimated product-
time fixed effects from the GMM estimation onto corresponding characteristics plus product fixed
effects after controlling for price endogeneity. Remaining mean utility estimates based on the projection
of the estimated product fixed effects onto the remaining observable product characteristics.
type are closer substitutes for each other than those of a different spirit category. To corroborate
this point, we calculate the ratio of the average cross-price elasticity between each focal product
and all products that share its spirit type and the average cross-price elasticity between the product
and all remaining products. This ratio amounts to 17.1 for brandies – suggesting that the average
cross-price elasticity within brandies is 17.1 times the cross-price elasticity of a brandy and other
products; 6.5 for cordials; 18.1 for gins; 9.8 for rums; 7.4 for vodkas; and 5.8 for whiskeys. In
Table D.I in Appendix D we also document the estimated best substitute for a variety of popular
products. The demand estimates thus generate sensible substitution patterns across products.
– 26 –
Turning to the own-price responsiveness of demand, the estimates in Table IV imply an
average elasticity for a given product of −3.86. Rums, brandies, and cordials have less elastic
demand than vodka and whiskey products. Similarly, demand for 375 ml bottles is less elastic
than for 1.75 L bottles, with the medium-sized 750 ml bottles in-between. We also find that
cheap spirit products have less elastic demand than more expensive products. See Table V. These
elasticities are similar to those reported in Conlon and Rao (2015) and Aguirregabiria et al. (2016)
who both estimate alcohol demand using disaggregate data. They are also robust to our choice of
price instruments. In Appendix C.1, we document that the price coefficient is stable when using
alternative instruments in the second stage of estimation and that accounting for price endogeneity
due to upstream responses, as expected, entails a larger estimated price coefficient than a simple
OLS specification.
The model estimates imply an average price elasticity of off-premise spirit demand of −2.8.
That is, a one percent increase in the retail price of all spirits leads to a 2.8% decrease in the
aggregate quantity of off-premise spirits demanded. Earlier literature, however, documents less
elastic demand estimates for alcoholic beverages in general, and spirits in particular. Based on
a review of the literature, Leung and Phelps (1993) conclude that the price elasticity of demand
for distilled spirits is −1.5. Two effects likely drive the discrepancy between our results and this
work. First, rather than estimating the elasticity of total alcohol consumption, we exclude the
presumably less price sensitive consumption in bars and restaurants. Second, the earlier studies
use state or national consumption data whereas we have detailed local data on consumption choices.
In Appendix C.2 we show that aggregation in our data drives the price coefficient and consequently
the estimated elasticity for spirits towards zero. We also show in Table C.IV that values of the
price coefficient that generate elasticities consistent with Leung and Phelps (1993) imply demand
curves which are inconsistent with upstream profit-maximization.
Lastly, the demand estimates translate into sensible variation in estimated elasticities across
markets that differ in consumer demographics. In line with the consumption differences from
Section 3.4, markets with high concentrations of wealthy and educated consumers exhibit product
demands that are relatively less elastic, while markets with concentrations of young people tend to
have more elastic demands for individual spirits. Demand for spirits as a category is less elastic in
markets with large minority populations and markets with greater levels of income and education.
The analysis so far has focused on estimating a measure of the elasticity of demand for
alcoholic beverages (ε) that reflects the systematic differences between products. Heterogeneity
in consumer preferences for these differentiated products translates into variation in product-level
elasticities that filters through to the aggregate elasticity for spirits, one of the two key determinants
of optimal tax rates. The second is the strategic price response of distillers (η), the estimation of
which we turn to next.
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Table V: Estimated Product Elasticities, Upstream Marginal Costs, and Upstream
Market Power
εjt(p
r) cˆjt Lernerjt
Price Avg SD Avg SD Avg SD
By Firm:
Bacardi 17.66 -4.21 1.58 7.80 5.37 32.21 13.83
Beam 12.89 -3.39 1.03 4.89 2.91 38.35 12.19
Diageo 17.08 -4.15 1.44 7.38 4.79 32.34 11.42
Other Firms (34) 15.23 -3.81 1.41 6.40 4.43 35.07 15.95
By Price and Size:
expensive 20.37 -4.73 1.37 9.43 4.62 25.94 8.15
cheap 11.04 -3.04 0.84 3.79 1.98 42.92 14.75
375 ml 9.16 -2.54 0.83 2.71 2.07 53.54 20.32
750 ml 14.43 -3.76 1.23 5.99 3.57 34.35 11.28
1.75 L 21.16 -4.68 1.39 9.34 5.13 26.30 6.80
all products 15.63 -3.86 1.41 6.53 4.51 34.66 14.70
Notes: “Price” is measured in dollars; “Average” refers to the simple average of the corresponding category while “SD” is the
standard deviation. Appendix D presents the full elasticity distributions by spirit type and bottle size. Estimated marginal
costs (cˆjt) are based on product-level marginal costs for each pricing period using the firm first-order conditions in equation (27)
under the assumption that firms set prices for products in their observed product portfolios. “Lernerjt” the Lerner index for
product j in period t defined as 100× p
w
jt−cˆjt
pwjt
.
5.4 The Upstream Marketplace
To characterize the upstream response to changes in the downstream tax rate, we require estimates
of distiller marginal cost. We use our demand estimates and the data on wholesale price and
quantity sold to back out product-level marginal costs for each pricing period that imply that
distillers maximize profit following the model of distiller conduct from Section 4.2 and the associated
optimality conditions in equation (27). Since we observe both wholesale and retail prices, we do not
impose any supply-side restrictions on prices during estimation, which alleviates the identification
concerns of Villas-Boas and Hellerstein (2006). Here, we assume that firms set wholesale prices
that internalize the effect of each product’s price on the remaining products in their portfolio; the
ownership matrix Ow simply reflects the firms’ portfolios during the sample period.
The resulting cost estimates cˆ are reasonable (see middle columns of Table V). The marginal
cost of expensive products is on average 2.5 times that of inexpensive products; for a subset of
brandies and whiskeys with detailed product information, we find that the marginal cost of products
that are aged for five or more years is 1.3 and 1.4 times the cost of non-aged products for brandies
and whiskeys, respectively. Lastly, imported products are 1.8 times more costly than non-imported
products on average.
We use these cost estimates to assess market power in the distillery market. The last
columns in Table V indicate that the average Lerner index is 34.66%: out of every dollar received
from the PLCB distillers take home 35 cents in profits. Diageo, Bacardi, and Beam products
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generate average margins of 32.3%, 32.2%, and 38.4%, respectively.28 Small bottles have higher
margins (54% on average) than large bottles (26% on average) due to their less elastic demand.
There is less heterogeneity across spirit types as the average whiskey generates a margin of 32.5%
compared to 37.6% and 36.7% for the average brandy and rum, respectively.
These estimates of upstream market power suggest that distillers can do much to counteract
changes in PLCB policy. The upstream response is more complex than in the single-product
monopoly model of Section 2: as above, a modification in PLCB policy generates incentives for
distillers to adjust wholesale price and, indirectly through the pricing rule, retail price, to offset the
effect of a tax rate change on demand. With multiple products, there is always the possibility of
substitution across products rather than just to the outside option, however, and firms coordinate
pricing across their full portfolio of products.
To highlight the inputs into the firms’ wholesale price response, Table VI first summarizes
the responsiveness of retail prices to an increase in the tax rate, holding fixed wholesale prices at
the levels observed in the data. The PLCB pricing formula implies that on average, a one-percent
increase in the tax rate beyond the level observed in the data translates into a 0.57% increase
in retail prices. The observed variation in tax elasticities reflects differences in price levels across
producers and product categories, as well as variation in the relative contribution to final retail
prices of the per-unit handling fee, which we denote as LTMF in Section 3.2 and hold constant
throughout. It amounts to a larger share of the retail markup for cheap products than for expensive
products, contributing to the lower tax elasticity of retail prices for cheap products.
In the right-most columns of Table VI we describe the upstream price response to such a tax
rate increase by calculating the percent change in wholesale price as the tax rate rises by one percent
– or η in the simple monopoly model above. As in the simple model from Section 2, we observe
the tax rate and upstream wholesale prices are strategic substitutes, i.e., η < 0. Across products,
distillers reduce wholesale price by an average of 0.20% when the tax rate rises by 1% above the
observed level, but there is significant heterogeneity in the response. The reduction in wholesale
price is greatest among cheap and 375 ml products. This estimated strategic substitutability of
wholesale prices and tax rates suggests that the na¨ıve retail price responsiveness estimates in column
1 overstate the equilibrium increase in retail prices after a tax rate hike. In the following section,
we formally assess the magnitude of the distiller response and its effect on mitigating the retail
price pass-through of alternative tax rates.
28Financial disclosures for seven public distillers during the sample period report gross profit margins that are
comparable to the estimated Lerner indeces, albeit while deriving from the companies’ aggregate sales across
states. For instance, the average gross profit margin among public distillers amounts to 37.80%; Diageo’s gross
profit margin (30.04%) is lower than Beam’s (46.06%).
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Table VI: Retail and Wholesale Price Responses to
Changes in Tax Policy
Retail Price Wholesale Price
Response (ψ) [η = 0] Response [η]
Avg SD Avg SD
By Firm:
Bacardi 0.58 0.03 −0.18 0.09
Beam 0.57 0.02 −0.19 0.08
Diageo 0.59 0.02 −0.17 0.08
Other Firms (34) 0.56 0.05 −0.22 0.17
By Price and Size:
expensive 0.60 0.02 −0.13 0.05
cheap 0.55 0.04 −0.27 0.16
375 ml 0.52 0.05 −0.43 0.21
750 ml 0.58 0.03 −0.18 0.07
1.75 L 0.58 0.02 −0.14 0.05
all products 0.57 0.04 −0.20 0.14
Notes: “Avg” and “SD” are the sales-weighted (bottles) average and standard deviation of the
corresponding category. “Retail Price Response” is the percent change in retail price from a one percent
increase in the ad valorem tax rate, holding fixed upstream prices. “Wholesale Price Response” is the
percent change in wholesale price given a one percent increase in the ad valorem tax rate, assuming
upstream conduct based on product ownership. Retail and wholesale price response calculated at the
observed tax rate in the data of τ = 53.4%.
6 Laffer Curves: Policymaker Foresight and Market Conduct
We now use our estimates of spirit demand and upstream marginal costs to measure effect of
distiller pricing responses on state tax revenue. The goal of this section is to characterize the
Laffer curve that traces tax revenue as the PLCB varies its ad valorem tax, τ , while holding other
aspects of the pricing regulation fixed. We emphasize τ as the central policy instrument since
control and non-control states use ad valorem taxes in the regulation of alcohol. As taxation of
goods is commonly done with ad valorem taxes (e.g., sales taxes) our results can therefore be
extended to a broad set of industries. Our focus on the PLCB ’s ability to generate tax revenue
for the state’s general fund is motivated by ongoing efforts in the state legislature at reforming the
Pennsylvania wine and spirits retail markets. For example, the Pennsylvania Legislature’s Act 39,
which took effect in August 2016, granted the PLCB limited pricing flexibility in allowing it to
price its best-selling items, defined as the top-selling 150 SKUs, “in a manner that maximizes the
return on the sale of those items.”29
A regulator and 37 firms producing 312 products may interact in multiple ways. The degree
to which the PLCB understands and internalizes the optimal responses of distillers and consumers
to changes in tax policy is unclear. Rather than taking a stand on the ability of the PLCB to
anticipate agents’ responses, we choose to use the model to evaluate the influence of distillers on
29Omnibus Amendment to Pennsylvania’s Liquor Code, Act of Jun. 8, 2016, P.L. 273, No. 39. Full text available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/uconsCheck.cfm?yr=2016&sessInd=0&act=39. At the time of
this writing, the PLCB has taken advantage of this pricing flexibility only a limited number of times.
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the final outcome of the policy under different beliefs or information assumptions on the part of
the regulator.
6.1 The Laffer Curve and Na¨ıve Policymakers: Mechanical Effect
The first alternative we consider is an application of the famous critique of Lucas (1976) in which
the PLCB mistakenly believes that upstream firms lack the interest or ability to react to changes
in policy: η(τ) = 0. This is the so-called “mechanical effect” of taxation where we assume firms do
not respond to changes in the tax policy, although we allow for re-optimization by consumers to
changes in retail price. We call this the “Na¨ıve” equilibrium.
We solve for this equilibrium by varying the PLCB ’s tax rate from ten to ninety percent
using one percentage point increments. Throughout we incorporate into the markup the Johnstown
alcohol tax of 18% so current policy corresponds to a tax rate of 53.4%. For each tax level and
fixed vector of wholesale prices, we solve for the new vector of retail prices in equation (16) and
rely on the estimated demand system to predict consumer spirit purchases and PLCB tax revenue.
Figure 2: Tax Rate, Spirit Demand Elasticity, and the Laffer Curve
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Notes: Absolute value of the spirit demand elasticity and the PLCB Laffer curve under constant wholesale prices. “PLCB Tax
Rate” is in percent and includes the 18% Johnstown Flood tax. The solid vertical line corresponds to the current policy; the
dashed line to the tax revenue maximizing policy.
Figure 2 plots the resulting absolute value of the demand elasticity of spirits as a category (ε
in Section 2) and the PLCB ’s tax revenue as a function of the ad valorem tax τ for fixed wholesale
prices. Panel (a) shows that off-premise spirit demand becomes increasingly elastic as the tax rate
(and retail price) increases. Spirit demand is elastic for even small values of the tax, indicating
that the wholesale prices in the data, assumed constant here, generate retail prices on the elastic
portion of the demand curve for a wide variety of tax rates.
In panel (b) we plot the associated tax revenue the PLCB would generate under the
alternative rates. For small values of the tax rate, the Laffer curve is steep, reflecting lower demand
elasticities for spirits as a category. As we move past the peak into the “prohibitive” range, the slope
becomes flatter as the demand elasticity stabilizes. Under the current 53.4% tax rate, the agency
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forgoes significant tax revenue by overpricing spirits. The PLCB could maximize tax revenue with
a tax rate of 30.7%, leading to an estimated increase in tax revenue of 7.8%, or $28.7 million, and a
decrease in retail prices of 13%. In response, consumption would increase by 47.5%, or 28.6 million
bottles, which in turn would lead to a 51% increase in upstream profits, or $79.7 million.
6.2 The Laffer Curve and Na¨ıve Policymakers: Behavioral Response
Next, we allow distillers to exploit the market power we demonstrate in Section 5.4 by responding
to the PLCB ’s na¨ıve policy. The difference between the intended goal analyzed in the Na¨ıve
equilibrium and the realized goal in what we call the “Response” equilibrium identifies the degree
to which upstream firms can unravel the PLCB ’s policy. This is commonly known as the “behavioral
response” (Saez, 2001). The taxation literature typically considers only behavioral responses related
to the general equilibrium effect of taxation on the entry and exit of firms in a perfectly competitive
industry. As we consider firms with market power, the behavioral response we consider here
encompasses the wholesale pricing response to taxes as a function of the nature of competition
among upstream firms. The difference between Na¨ıve and Response equilibria thus establishes the
potential error in assuming perfect competition among firms.
Figure 3: Distiller Response and the Laffer Curve
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Vertical line corresponds to the current 53.4% policy.
In panel (a) of Figure 3 we present the upstream firm response elasticity η under different
choices of the tax rate. We solve for the response elasticity numerically by comparing Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium wholesale prices for each incremental one percent change in the PLCB ad valorem tax
rate (τ). Three characteristics of the upstream response stand out. First, the upstream response
to changes in the PLCB tax rate varies significantly across products, as illustrated through the
middle 50% interquartile range for η (shaded region). This reflects differences in product elasticities
driven by differences in product characteristics, firm portfolios, and consumer demand. Second,
the upstream firm response becomes more muted at higher tax rates reflecting the curvature of
log-concave demand increasing in price (Fabinger and Weyl, 2016). Third, at no point in the range
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of tax rates we consider do firms choose not to respond, consistent with the existence of market
power and in stark contrast with the predictions of models of commodity taxation in competitive
environments so common in public finance.
In panel (b) we compare the Na¨ıve and Response Laffer curves to assess the aggregate
implications of ignoring firm market power. Response Laffer curves are flatter and shift down
and to the right, crossing the Na¨ıve Laffer curve at the observed equilibrium in the data. The
change in location and shape reflects distillers maximizing profits by moving their wholesale prices
in the opposite direction of any change in the PLCB tax rate. We again find that current tax
policy overprices spirits though the revenue-maximizing tax rate increases from 30.7% when we
hold wholesale prices fixed to 39.3% when we allow for the strategic firm response with the current
product portfolios, i.e., the “Base.”
Table VII: Maximizing Tax Revenue and Distiller Responses
Base Single Product Collusive
Na¨ıve Response Na¨ıve Response Na¨ıve Response
Markup (%) 30.68 30.68 30.90 30.90 29.15 29.15
Percent Change:
- Bottles 47.52 34.59 46.34 34.22 56.47 34.98
- Distiller Price (pw) 0.00 3.79 0.00 3.61 0.00 5.83
- Retail Price (pr) −13.36 −10.45 −13.22 −10.45 −14.35 −9.90
- Distiller Profit 51.33 56.22 50.22 55.35 60.62 62.51
- Tax Revenue (T ) 7.75 1.01 7.49 1.15 9.75 −1.36
Elasticities:
- Spirits Demand (ε) −2.63 −2.73 −2.60 −2.70 −2.78 −2.93
- Wholesale Price Response (η) 0.00 −0.24 0.00 −0.23 0.00 −0.33
- Retail Price Response (ψ) 0.67 0.47 0.66 0.47 0.68 0.40
Consumer Pass-Through 100.00 69.04 100.00 70.06 100.00 57.18
Notes: “Markup” is in percent and includes the 18% Johnstown Flood tax. “Percent Change” is the percent change in the
corresponding statistic from its value under the tax rate in the data (τ = 53.4%) and wholesale prices implied by the assumed
competitive conduct. Wholesale prices based on estimates of upstream marginal costs presented in Table V. “Retail Price
Response” is the percent change in retail price from a one percent increase in the ad valorem tax rate (τ) including the
upstream firm response. Retail and wholesale price response calculated at the markup in row 1. “Consumer Pass-Through”
is the share of an incremental tax change borne by consumers. Where applicable, statistics are the sales-weighted (bottles)
average.
To summarize the consequences of na¨ıve policy making, we show in Table VII the aggregate
effect on prices, consumption, and tax revenue of the PLCB reducing its tax rate to 30.7%, which
it na¨ıvely believes to be the revenue maximizing tax level. In response, upstream firms increase
wholesale prices by 3.8% on average. Appendix E contains detailed results for individual firms. The
upstream response, which increases distiller profit gains by an additional 4.89 percentage points
relative to the na¨ıve scenario, limits the PLCB ’s gain in tax revenue to 1% of profit at current
rates, or only 12.97% of the envisioned tax revenue of a na¨ıve regulator.
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We summarize the impact on consumers using two measures. The average response elasticity
of the retail price with respect to the tax rate captures the extent to which the tax decrease
translates into retail price decreases. It is only 0.47, instead of 0.67 under the na¨ıve policy. Upstream
firms raising wholesale price with the tax rate cut limits the retail price decrease to 10.5%, instead
of 13.4%. Second, we report consumer pass-through rates which we construct as the average share
of the incremental tax under the new percent markup that is reflected in the retail price. The
PLCB ’s mechanical pricing rule implies a 100% retail price pass-through when wholesale prices
cannot adjust; in the na¨ıve scenario, the price thus changes by the full amount of the incremental
tax. Under the response equilibrium, we calculate the change in retail price when not only the
markup but also wholesale prices change, as a share of the same incremental tax. With wholesale
price adjustments, we find that only 69.0% of the tax decrease in moving to a tax rate of 30.7%
feeds through to the retail price. Quantity consumed thus increases by a more limited amount than
anticipated by the PLCB , and the optimal wholesale pricing response to changes in τ nearly fully
undermines the achievement of the PLCB ’s tax revenue goal.
To highlight the effect of the degree of imperfect competition on the location and shape of
the Laffer curve, we also consider two departures from Bertrand-Nash pricing. In the first, a product
manager in each firm chooses the price for her product without internalizing the effects of that price
choice on the demand for other products in the firm’s portfolio. We call this form of conduct “Single
Product” to represent the most competitive behavior possible within a differentiated products
Bertrand pricing oligopoly. In the second, we allow all firms to jointly set prices, and we call
this form of conduct “Collusive.” In each alternative conduct scenario, we solve for the upstream
response using the same marginal cost estimates as in the base conduct case.30
We plot these Response Laffer curves alongside the Na¨ıve and Base Response Laffer curves in
Figure 3. The figure highlights several implications of departing from multi-product Bertrand-Nash
pricing. Not surprisingly, the intensity of upstream competition affects the level of tax revenue the
PLCB realizes. Across tax rates, revenues are lowest when upstream conduct is collusive. For the
tax rate in the data of 53.4%, for example, the ability of upstream firms to jointly set wholesale
prices reduces tax revenue by 13.6% relative to base conduct (Table E.I). In contrast, revenues
are uniformly higher under single-product pricing than under multi-product pricing, reflecting the
more competitive upstream market. The difference is not pronounced, however: for this same tax
rate of 53.4%, the increase in tax revenue over the base conduct case is only 1.7%. This similarity
between tax revenue and distiller profit under the two forms of conduct reflects the large distillers’
broad product portfolios covering multiple spirit types that we describe in Section 3.3. This limits
the role of business stealing across products in the firm’s portfolio that pricing under the base form
of conduct internalizes (see Section 4.2).
30We compute the Laffer curves under the alternative forms of firm conduct as follows. First, we use the estimates
of marginal cost (Table V) and the firm first-order conditions (Equation 27) under single-product and collusive
ownership matrices Ow to solve for wholesale prices at the observed tax rate of 53.4%. This enables construction
of the Na¨ıve Laffer curve condition on firm conduct. We construct the corresponding Response and Stackelberg
equilibria by varying the PLCB tax rate τ and resolving for the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 3 also demonstrates that the Response Laffer curves shift down and to the right
and flatten under all three conduct scenarios.31 We find similar patterns if instead of focusing on
Pennsylvania in aggregate, we compare the Na¨ıve and Response Laffer curves for subsets of store
markets at the top and bottom of the distributions of income, educational attainment, age, and
size of the minority population. The patterns here are thus not the result of pooling markets with
different demographic makeups and, consequently, different distributions of demand elasticities (see
Appendix E). We thus conclude that the response of distillers with imperfectly competitive market
conduct generally erodes the PLCB ’s na¨ıve policy.
Table VII illustrates that the ability of upstream firms to erode the PLCB ’s na¨ıve policy is
higher the less competitive the upstream market. We contrast the na¨ıve and response equilibria for
all three forms of upstream conduct. In line with additional market power reducing the PLCB ’s
ability to raise revenue broadly, we find that the revenue-maximizing tax rate is 29.2% when
wholesale prices are fixed at collusive upstream prices, but 30.9% when wholesale prices are fixed
at single-product upstream prices. The upstream response to a move to such na¨ıvely optimal tax
rates is similar to the above when distillers price as single-product firms: tax revenue increases only
by 1.2%, instead of 7.5% under the na¨ıve equilibrium, relative to tax revenue at the current tax
rates and single-product wholesale prices. At the other extreme, a collusive response by upstream
firms to moving to the na¨ıvely optimal tax rate results in a 1.4% reduction in expected revenue
relative to revenue under the current tax rate and collusive wholesale prices. Hence, not accounting
for market power among regulated firms leads to a suboptimal policy recommendation with more
significant unanticipated effects on tax collection for less competitive taxed industries.
6.3 The Laffer Curve and Policymakers with Perfect Foresight
We now compare the Na¨ıve and Response equilibria to one in which the regulator has perfect
foresight and correctly anticipates the distiller response. Graphically, we observe this “Stackelberg”
equilibrium as the tax rate that maximizes tax revenue of the response Laffer curve conditional
on our assumption of upstream conduct. This strategic pricing game between upstream distillers
and the PLCB as the downstream retailer resembles the classic double-marginalization problem
considered in the vertical contracting literature (e.g., Villas-Boas 2007 and Mortimer 2008). Since
the PLCB has traditionally committed to a tax rate through legislative oversight, we assume –
in contrast to the contracting literature – that the PLCB moves first in choosing the tax rate τ
(equivalent to a downstream markup), before upstream firms respond by setting the wholesale price
pw. For each conduct assumption, we solve for the tax rate τ that maximizes PLCB tax revenue,
the peak of the Laffer curves of Figure 3, given the firms’ wholesale price responses. We summarize
the resulting outcome in Table VIII.
The comparison of the Na¨ıve, Response, and Stackelberg regimes reveals how the regulator
has to alter its policy in order to accommodate the optimal distiller response and still achieve the
31For simplicity, we omit the na¨ıve Laffer curves for collusive and single-product upstream pricing from Figure 3.
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objective of maximizing tax revenues. The Stackelberg equilibrium under the base assumption of
upstream firms choosing prices for all products in their portfolio, entails the lowering of the tax
rate from 53.4% to only 39.3%, instead of 30.7% under the na¨ıve equilibrium. Current policy thus
overprices spirits and is in the “prohibitive range” of the Laffer curve regardless of whether our
regulator is na¨ıve or has perfect foresight. The average retail price would be 6.48% (or $1.00)
lower in the Stackelberg equilibrium, relative to 10.45% ($1.61) in the base Response equilibrium.
While the PLCB is able to generate higher revenue under this lower tax rate, distillers are the
clear winners as the 30.8% increase in distiller profits far outpaces the PLCB ’s 2% growth in
tax revenue. As a share of the sum of upstream profit and tax revenue, distillers would account
for 34.9% under the Stackelberg equilibrium, compared to only 29.5% under current prices. The
Stackelberg equilibria under alternative assumptions on upstream conduct depart in similar ways
from the respective Na¨ıve equilibria. Appendix E contains detailed results, and Appendix C.4
investigates the robustness of our overpricing finding to alternative demand specifications.
Figure 4 investigates heterogeneity in the distillers’ profit impact of a move to revenue-
maximizing tax rates under the three policy regimes, contrasting the top three distillers with
upstream distillers as a group. It suggests that as the PLCB lowers tax rates, Diageo and Bacardi
benefit from their large product portfolios in extracting a greater share of industry profit across all
scenarios. See Appendix Table E.I for detail. We also illustrate the effect of moving to revenue-
maximizing tax rates for consumers in terms of total expenditure on spirits products. Consistent
with the current markup being too high across all policy regimes, we find that consumer expenditure
Table VIII: Tax Revenue and Regulator Foresight
Base Single Product Collusive
Markup (%) 39.31 39.18 42.07
Percent Change:
- Bottles 19.62 19.84 14.35
- Distiller Price (pw) 2.21 2.15 2.45
- Retail Price (pr) −6.48 −6.60 −4.65
- Distiller Profit 30.80 31.06 24.08
- Tax Revenue (T ) 2.23 2.27 1.40
Elasticities:
- Spirits Demand (ε) −2.76 −2.73 −2.96
- Wholesale Price Response (η) −0.21 −0.21 −0.28
- Retail Price Response (ψ) 0.45 0.45 0.38
Consumer Pass-Through 70.28 71.25 60.07
Notes: “Markup” is in percent and includes the 18% Johnstown Flood tax. “Percent Change” is the
percent change in the corresponding statistic from its value under the tax rate in the data (τ = 53.4%)
and wholesale prices implied by the assumed competitive conduct. Wholesale prices based on estimates
of upstream marginal costs presented in Table V. “Retail Price Response” is the percent change in retail
price from a one percent increase in the ad valorem tax rate (τ) including the upstream firm response.
Retail and wholesale price response calculated at the markup in row 1. “Consumer Pass-Through” is
the share of an incremental tax change borne by consumers.
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Figure 4: Tax Incidence Across Equilibria
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uniformly increases by between 18.4 and 39.6% across regimes. The largest increases arise under the
Na¨ıve and Response equilibria where the average retail price declines induce significant increases
in spirit consumption, driving up spending.
7 Concluding Remarks
We study the relationship between commodity taxation and tax revenues in a noncompetitive
industry. We show the existence of a Laffer curve with an optimal, tax revenue maximizing,
rate that depends not only on the elasticity of demand but also on the tax authority’s ability
to anticipate the pricing response of taxed firms to commodity taxation. Accounting for both
effects, we show that reducing the tax rate below typical levels of sales taxes would raise total
tax revenue only for products with highly elastic demands. This indicates that current sales taxes
are below optimal levels for the vast majority of products. For demand elasticities in the range of
those generally estimated for differentiated consumer products, the optimal commodity tax rate is
significantly higher, but indeed similar to commonly observed excise tax rates, such as those on
alcoholic beverages.
Against this backdrop, we empirically analyze alcohol taxation in the Pennsylvania spirits
market. We show the current 53.4% ad valorem tax is excessively high irrespective of any antic-
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ipation by the tax authority of a strategic price response by distillers to its choice of tax rate.
Our estimated demand system for differentiated spirits, combined with a game-theoretic model of
distiller pricing that accounts for the response of upstream firms to changes in tax policy, allows us
to characterize Laffer curves in a wide variety of scenarios. We find that upstream market power
and price responses mitigate the effect of any tax policy change on tax revenue, reducing the ability
of the tax authority to drive revenue generation via tax policy changes.
We point to oligopolistic firms’ strategic price responses as the most important behavioral
effect of taxation rather than the entry and exit channel used in the existing public economics
literature. Our results suggest that assuming perfect competition among firms in their pricing has
the potential to generate poor policy recommendations: Regardless of the policymaker’s objective –
be it tied to tax revenues, overall consumption levels, or equilibrium prices – we show that ignoring
firms’ price responses neglects their ability to undo the realization of the policymaker’s objective.
Recent work by Fowlie, Reguant and Ryan (2016) similarly points to the role of market power by
firms and the associated allocative inefficiencies as a limiting factor for the realization of social
benefits of corrective taxation. While theoretical work going back to Musgrave (1959), Bishop
(1968), and Buchanan (1969) has long recognized the need to account for the nature of competition
in optimal commodity and corrective taxation, our work highlights the empirical relevance of their
conclusions, in particular since perfectly competitive markets are regrettably rare in practice.
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Appendix
A Data
We begin with a discussion of how we aggregate the initial daily, store-level PLCB data and how we
define market areas served by each store. To reduce the size of the estimation sample, we aggregate
over days where prices remain unchanged. PLCB regulation allows price to change only for two
reasons: permanent and temporary wholesale price changes. Both follow set timing requirements.
Permanent price changes can take effect on the first day of one of the PLCB ’s thirteen four-week
long accounting period (“reporting periods”). Temporary sales, on the other hand, begin on the
last Monday of each month and last for either four or five weeks until the day before the last
Monday of the following month; we denote such periods as “pricing periods”. Reporting periods
and pricing periods thus align, but not perfectly; the vast majority of days in a typical pricing
period overlap with an initial reporting period, and the remainder with the next. Since temporary
price reductions are more prevalent than permanent ones (84.8% of price changes in the sample are
temporary in nature), we use pricing periods as our time interval to avoid having multiple very short
periods. This results in 34 pricing periods during which prices remain constant. For permanent
price changes in a reporting period that bisects two sales pricing periods, we assume that the price
change takes effect in the pricing period that most overlaps with the given reporting period. In
aggregating our daily sales data to the level of the sales pricing period, we treat a product as being
available in a store if it sold at least once during a given period. The length of the pricing period
alleviates concern about distinguishing product availability from lack of sales in the period.
Stores exhibit significant variation in the product composition of purchases. These dif-
ferences reflect heterogeneity in consumer preferences more than differences in the availability of
products across stores: Of the 100 best selling products statewide in 2003, the median store carried
98.0%, while a store at the fifth percentile carried 72.0% of the products. Similarly, of the 1000
best selling products statewide in 2003, the median store carried 82.03%, while a store at the fifth
percentile carried 44.2% of the products. The product availability at designated “premium” stores
is somewhat better than the average, with the median premium store carrying all of the top 100
products and 95.1% of the top 1000 products. A consumer can also request to have any regular
product in the PLCB ’s product catalog shipped to his local store for free, should that store not
carry the product.
The fact that most stores carry most popular products and can provide access to all
products in the catalog easily, together with the absence of price differences across stores, supports
an assumption underlying our demand model: Differences in product availability do not drive
consumers’ store choices to a significant degree and as a result, consumers visit the store closest
to them. In making this assumption, which allows us to focus on the consumer’s choice between
different liquor products available at the chosen store, we follow previous studies using scanner data
such as Chintagunta and Singh (2003).
In assigning consumers to stores, we calculate for each of Pennsylvania’s 10,351 regular block
groups the straight-line distance to each store and assign consumers to the closest open store for
each pricing period. In instances where the PLCB operates more than one store within a ZIP code,
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we aggregate sales across stores to the ZIP code level; there are 114 such ZIP codes out of a total
of 1,775. Note that these instances include both store relocations, where a store moved from one
location in a ZIP code to another during our sample period, but the data contain separate records
for the store in the two locations, and instances where the PLCB operates two stores simultaneously
within a ZIP code.32 We consider the resulting block group zones as separate markets. Figure A.1
illustrates this aggregation of block groups into markets and shows the markets as of January 2003.
We repeat this procedure for each pricing period to account for changes in demographics after store
openings and closings. In total, we observe two permanent store closings and 19 permanent store
openings over the three year period. 125 stores are closed for at least one pricing period; these
temporary store closings last on average 2.73 pricing periods. Store closings and openings introduce
variation in the demographics of the population served by each store, in addition to cross-sectional
variation in demographics, that we exploit to identify heterogeneous tastes for spirits.
Figure A.1: Pennsylvania Markets as of January 2003
We derive consumer demographics for the store’s zone by calculating the total population
of drinking age and population-weighted average demographics, including the percent of the pop-
ulation that is non-white, has at least some college experience, and is between the ages of 21 and
29 years, and the population-weighted income distribution. In the case of income, we obtained
detailed information on each block group’s discrete income distribution by racial identity of the
head of household, with household income divided into one of 16 categories. We aggregate across
racial groups and across block groups in a store’s market area to derive the income distribution
for white households separately from non-white households. We construct two income measures.
First, we calculate the share of high-income households, defined as households with incomes above
$50,000. We use this metric to present differences in consumption patterns across demographic
32We drop wholesale stores, administrative locations, and stores without valid address information, for a total of 13
stores.
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groups (e.g., Figure 1). Second, we fit continuous market-specific distributions to the discrete
income distributions conditional on minority status. We employ generalized beta distributions
of the second kind to fit the empirical income distributions in each market conditional on racial
group (i.e., 456-x-2). McDonald (1984) highlights that the beta distribution provides a good fit
to empirical income data relative to other parametric distributions. We use these distributions to
simulate agents in the estimation and when constructing equilibria underlying the Laffer curves in
Section 6.
We similarly obtained information on educational attainment by minority status and ag-
gregated across several categories of educational attainment to derive the share of the population
above the age of 25 with at least some college education, by minority status and market area. We
also obtained the share of young population between the ages of 21 and 29 by market area.
Our price instruments come from two sources. First, the data on retail prices in other
liquor control states is from the National Alcohol Beverage Control Association and consists of
monthly product-level shelf prices by liquor control state. We assign a month to our Pennsylvania
pricing periods to facilitate a match between the two data sets. Second, we obtained historical
commodity prices for corn and sugar from Quandl, a data aggregator. The prices are the monthly
price of a “continuous contract” for each commodity where a “continuous contract” is defined as
a hypothetical chained composite of a variety of futures contracts and is intended to represent the
spot market price of the given commodity. We also attained prices for rice, sorghum, wheat, barley,
oats, and glass (as a cost input for bottle size) but found these input costs provided little additional
explanatory power.
B Additional Descriptive Statistics
Table B.I presents the distribution of bottle prices contained in our sample of 312 products. The
average price is increasing across bottle sizes both within a category and for the whole sample.
Whiskeys tend to be the most expensive products while Brandies, Rums, and Vodkas are less
expensive. These statistics mask heterogeneity across products. For instance, Vodkas tend to be
inexpensive on average, $13.81 per bottle, but average prices range from the 375 ml Nikolai Vodka
at $3.88 to the 1.75 L Grey Goose at $48.40. In Table B.II we present market shares based on
quantity (bottles sold), retail revenue, and PLCB tax revenue.
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Table B.I: Bottle Prices by Spirit Type and Bottle Size
Spirit Type Average Median SD Max Min
brandy 13.91 11.23 7.00 36.11 5.42
375 ml 9.19 6.01 4.42 15.31 5.42
750 ml 14.47 9.93 7.63 36.11 9.25
1.75 L 18.68 19.25 1.72 22.24 16.70
cordials 14.94 14.99 5.78 38.47 5.99
375 ml 10.41 10.28 3.07 19.24 5.99
750 ml 15.14 15.35 5.04 31.15 5.99
1.75 L 25.92 24.98 6.86 38.47 18.26
gin 15.63 14.54 7.59 39.50 4.79
375 ml 7.91 6.94 2.51 12.06 4.79
750 ml 13.61 10.60 5.37 22.16 5.99
1.75 L 19.54 17.10 8.24 39.50 11.71
rum 14.25 13.56 5.30 26.44 5.07
375 ml 6.62 6.43 0.71 7.49 5.07
750 ml 12.57 12.99 2.35 19.57 7.75
1.75 L 19.90 21.16 4.83 26.44 12.99
vodka 13.81 12.25 7.49 48.40 3.88
375 ml 5.13 4.06 2.38 14.34 3.88
750 ml 15.18 14.82 5.04 26.58 6.17
1.75 L 16.84 12.90 7.53 48.40 10.83
whiskey 16.81 15.48 7.59 45.99 5.51
375 ml 8.75 9.63 2.53 15.45 5.51
750 ml 14.98 13.09 6.2 31.84 5.96
1.75 L 20.74 18.34 7.57 45.99 12.97
Notes: Statistics weighted by quantity of bottles sold.
Table B.II: Market Share by Type, Price, and Size
Share of Market
Products By Quantity By Revenue By Tax Revenue
By Spirit Type:
brandy 26 7.24 6.76 6.77
cordials 62 13.38 13.42 13.24
gin 28 6.91 7.25 7.23
rum 40 16.18 15.55 15.64
vodka 66 31.88 29.55 30.04
whiskey 90 24.41 27.47 27.08
By Price and Size:
expensive 150 46.89 62.41 59.94
cheap 162 53.11 37.59 40.06
375 ml 48 15.19 7.34 8.14
750 ml 170 50.2 48.82 48.42
1.75 L 94 34.61 43.85 43.43
all products 312 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: “Quantity” market share is based on bottles while “Revenue” and “Tax Revenue” are based
on dollars. “Cheap” (“Expensive”) products are those products whose mean price is below (above)
the mean price of other spirits in the same spirit type and bottle size. “Revenue” is retail price times
quantity sold while “Tax Revenue” is defined as retail price minus wholesale price times quantity sold:
(pr − pw)× q.
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C Robustness of Demand Estimates
This Appendix addresses a number of alternative specifications to highlight the robustness of our
reported estimates. We show that the inclusion of premium, border stores, or holiday periods
are mostly inconsequential. Aggregating sales across local markets leads to less elastic demand
estimates, along the lines of other studies using only aggregate sales data. We also show that the
inclusion of brand fixed effects helps control for unobservable quality differences across products.
An important robustness check deals with the equilibrium implications of flatter or steeper
demand estimates on markups, optimal tax rates, and optimal agents’ responses to changes in
tax policy. We show that our estimates are broadly consistent with profit maximization in the
upstream distiller segment while being on the prohibitive range of the Laffer curves. Thus, the
PLCB significantly overprices spirits if its goal is only to maximize tax revenues. Finally, we rule
out the existence of significant stockpiling that could bias our own-price elasticity estimates upward
and our cross-price elasticity estimates downward.
C.1 Alternative Price Instruments and Samples
In Table C.I we display the estimated mean price coefficient under alternative instrumenting
strategies. We label our primary specification as IV1.
Table C.I: Price Endogeneity
OLS IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
price -0.2673 -0.3062 -0.3073 -0.3114 -0.3128
(0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0037)
First-Stage F-Stat.: — 1,333.19 1,297.06 1,217.18 1,196.74
Instruments:
- Input Prices X X X X
- Alabama X
- Iowa X X
- Idaho X X X X
- Michigan X
- Mississippi X
- Montana X X X
- North Carolina X X
- Oregon X X X X
- Utah X
- Wyoming X X X X
Notes: All estimates based on 10, 532 observations. Specifications include the same covariates as
in Table IV. Price instruments based on the average contemporaneous price among alternative sets
of control states outside the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions. “Input Prices” corresponds to
contemporaneous commodity prices for inputs (corn, sugar) interacted with spirit type to further
separate cost and demand shocks.
In Table C.II we use a simple OLS multinomial logit demand system to highlight the
robustness of our demand estimation results to alternative samples. Model (i), the most similar
to the full model, employs a similar estimation strategy where we first regress the logged ratio of
product to outside share on product-time and store fixed effects and interactions between average
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demographics and product characteristics (e.g., % minority × rum dummy). This model generates
product elasticities, both on average and for the spirit category, that are more inelastic than our
preferred mixed-logit model. In Models (ii)-(iv) we vary the number of markets to show that
including markets with premium and border stores and including the holiday period has little
effect on our estimated price coefficient and elasticities.
Table C.II: OLS Demand Estimates Based on Different Samples
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
price −0.2296 −0.2370 −0.2151 −0.2252
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0026)
Product FEs Y Y Y Y
Premium Stores Y N Y Y
Border Stores Y Y N Y
Holiday Period Y Y Y N
Statistics:
R2 0.9416 0.9418 0.9381 0.9582
N 10,532 10,532 10,532 8,670
Elasticities:
Average −3.5652 −3.6823 −3.3318 −3.4977
% Inelastic 0.7430 0.7429 0.7563 0.7481
Spirits −3.2351 −3.3800 −2.9816 −3.1684
Notes: The dependent variable for all models is the estimated product-time fixed effects from a
first-stage regression of log(Sjmt)−log(S0mt) onto product-time fixed effects and demographic-product
interactions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. “% Inelastic” is the percent of products with
inelastic demand. “Spirits” is the price elasticity of total PLCB off-premise spirit sales.
C.2 Aggregation
Table C.III: OLS Demand Estimates Using Aggregate Data
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
price −0.1218 −0.0508 −0.0822 −0.0109
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0018) (0.0013)
Brand FEs Y N Y N
Statistics:
R2 0.5052 0.2404 0.8101 0.1473
N 3,377,659 3,377,659 10,532 10,532
Elasticities:
Average −1.8910 −0.7885 −1.2764 −0.1686
% Inelastic 13.1151 78.5863 39.6494 100.0000
Spirits −1.7318 −0.7265 −1.1730 −0.1559
Notes: The dependent variable for models (i)-(ii) is log(Sjmt)−log(S0mt) while it is log(Sjt)−log(S0t) for models (iii)-(iv).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. “% Inelastic” is the percent of products with inelastic demand. “Spirits” is the
price elasticity of total PLCB off-premise spirit sales.
In Table C.III we estimate a simple OLS multinomial logit demand system using various
levels of aggregation. In Model (i) we deviate from our multi-step approach and estimate a one-
step model, regressing the logged ratio of product share to outside share on price, demographic
interactions, and fixed effects for brand (different bottle sizes of the same spirit label), bottle size,
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season, and store. Demand becomes much steeper than under Model (i) in Table C.II. In Model (ii)
we replace the brand fixed effects with indicators for spirit type and for imported spirits. Demand
becomes even more inelastic due to the coarseness of our observable characteristics that do not
capture any quality differences between spirits, e.g., two imported rums, that would lead to different
market shares and prices. In Models (iii)-(iv) we aggregate consumption to the state-level requiring
us to drop the demographic interactions but otherwise using the same controls as in Models (i)
and (ii). The inclusion of brand fixed effects is important to absorb differences in unobservable (to
the econometrician) characteristics across brands. Table C.III also shows that aggregation leads to
significantly less elastic estimates of product demand and an elasticity of off-premise spirits well
within the set of estimates reported in Leung and Phelps (1993). Highlighting the value of our
more detailed data, aggregation also increases the prevalence of inelastic product demand – a point
which we show below is inconsistent with upstream profit-maximization in our data.
C.3 Consumer Demand, Product Elasticities, and Upstream Markups
An advantage of our data and estimation approach is that we can estimate (Σ,Π, ρ) independent
of the mean utility parameters, including the mean price coefficient (α). As α modulates the
consumer response to changes in prices, it also affects the ability of upstream firms to charge prices
that entail significant markups as well as respond to changes in the tax rate. In Table C.IV, we
vary α exogenously to evaluate the equilibrium implications. This exercise serves two purposes.
First, it demonstrates how variation in the price coefficient impacts consumer demand, upstream
market power, and ultimately the ability of both consumers and firms to respond to changes in tax
policy. Second, it provides supporting evidence that current policy is indeed on the “prohibitive”
region of the Laffer curve.
Table C.IV: Elasticities, Marginal Costs, and Market Power
Under Alternative Price Coefficients (α)
Product Elasticities (ε) Upstream Firms
Price Coeff. (α) Spirits Average % Inelastic Lerner %MC < 0
-0.38 −3.70 −5.16 0.00 26.56 0.00
-0.36 −3.46 −4.81 0.00 28.35 0.05
-0.34 −3.22 −4.46 0.00 30.41 0.42
-0.32 −2.97 −4.11 0.00 32.79 0.74
-0.30 −2.73 −3.75 0.04 35.58 0.74
-0.28 −2.49 −3.40 0.11 38.91 0.74
-0.26 −2.24 −3.05 0.28 42.94 0.80
-0.24 −2.00 −2.70 0.62 47.95 1.46
-0.22 −1.75 −2.35 1.55 54.35 2.60
-0.20 −1.50 −2.00 4.25 62.92 5.79
Notes: Estimated price coefficient under the preferred IV specification is ˆα = −0.3062. For a given α
value we recover implied upstream marginal costs assuming upstream firm pricing based on observed
product ownership. “Spirits” elasticity refers to the elasticity of spirits as a category. We solve for
this numerically by increasing the retail price of spirits one percent. “Average” is the average price
elasticity across the products. “% Inelastic” is the percent of products with estimated price elasticity
less than one. “Lerner” is the average Lerner index defined as 100× pw−c
pw
. “%MC < 0” is the percent
of products with negative estimated marginal cost.
As suspected, alternative values of α rotate consumer demand resulting in significant
impacts to the consumer demand elasticities both by product and for spirits as a category. For
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instance, as we move towards zero from the estimated value of −0.3062, consumers become less
sensitive to changes in price leading to a decrease in the average product elasticity and a lower
value for the elasticity of spirits as a category. Ultimately, this pivoting leads to greater margins
for upstream firms while also enabling the PLCB to maximize tax revenue by charging a higher tax
rate. The results presented in Table C.IV also indicate the values for spirit demand documented
in the meta study by Leung and Phelps (1993) are improbable at least in our context and sample
period. To generate category level elasticities similar to the values found by researchers using state
or national data, α needs to be around −0.20 . At this point, however, 4.25% of products have
estimated inelastic demand while 5.79% of the implied upstream marginal costs are negative – both
of which are inconsistent with upstream profit-maximization.
C.4 Consumer Demand and the Prohibitive Region of the Laffer Curve
Our results indicate that regardless of regulatory foresight, the PLCB should choose to decrease
the tax rate below current levels to increase tax revenue, leading to a decrease in retail prices.
Apart from upstream conduct, this result reflects the demand elasticity we estimate from observed
consumer responses. Despite the fact that our demand estimates are robust to various alternative
specifications and instrumentation choices, in this section we investigate the sensitivity of this
overpricing result to our estimated mean price coefficient, α. In Table C.V we repeat the analysis
from Table C.IV and append statistics on the firm response elasticity as well as the PLCB ’s optimal
ad valorem tax τ? where we assume the PLCB operates under na¨ıve beliefs.
Table C.V: Over-Pricing Under Alternative Price Coefficients (α)
Product Elasticities (ε) Upstream Firms
Price Coeff. (α) Spirits Average % Inelastic Response (ε˜) Lerner %MC < 0 PLCB Mup (τ?)
Over-Pricing
-0.38 −3.70 −5.16 0.00 −0.14 26.56 0.00 20.91
-0.36 −3.46 −4.81 0.00 −0.15 28.35 0.05 23.55
-0.34 −3.22 −4.46 0.00 −0.16 30.41 0.42 26.70
-0.32 −2.97 −4.11 0.00 −0.17 32.79 0.74 30.58
-0.30 −2.73 −3.75 0.04 −0.19 35.58 0.74 35.34
-0.28 −2.49 −3.40 0.11 −0.20 38.91 0.74 41.35
-0.26 −2.24 −3.05 0.28 −0.22 42.94 0.80 49.26
Under-Pricing
-0.24 −2.00 −2.70 0.62 −0.24 47.95 1.46 60.10
-0.22 −1.75 −2.35 1.55 −0.26 54.35 2.60 76.72
-0.20 −1.50 −2.00 4.25 N/A 62.92 5.79 108.36
Notes: Estimated price coefficient under the preferred IV specification is αˆ = −0.3062. For a given α value we recover implied
upstream marginal costs assuming upstream firm pricing based on observed product ownership. “Spirits” elasticity refers to the
elasticity of spirits as a category. We solve for this numerically by increasing the retail price of spirits one percent. “Average”
is the average price elasticity across the products. “% Inelastic” is the percent of products with estimated price elasticity less
than one. “Response” is the average firm response elasticity (η) defined as the average percent change in wholesale price given
a one percent increase in the tax rate. We solve for this value numerically. When α = −0.20 we were unable to find an interior
solution to the firms’ pricing decision due to the large number of inelastic product demands.“Lerner” is the average wholesale
Lerner index defined as p
w−cˆ
pw
. “%MC < 0” is the percent of products with negative estimated wholesale marginal cost. “PLCB
Mup” is the tax revenue-maximizing markup under na¨ıve beliefs where a markup less (greater) than 53.4% implies that current
PLCB policy over-prices (under-prices) spirits. All upstream distiller statistics assume “Base” conduct.
Varying the price coefficient from an implied aggregate spirits elasticity of −3.7 to −1.5, we
find that the category elasticity would need to rise to at least −2 before the current tax rate places
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the PLCB on the upward sloping part of the Laffer curve. Such an aggregate elasticity, however, is
not consistent with profit maximizing behavior by upstream distillers given their observed prices:
For approximately 1% of products, we find that demand is inelastic; 1.5% of marginal costs are
negative, and upstream margins are on average 48%. This stands in contrast to industry estimates
which place the average wholesale margin earned by distillers at approximately 37%, in line with
what we obtain under our demand estimates which entail an average margin of 35%.
When α=−0.2452, the current PLCB policy maximizes tax revenue assuming the regulator
has Na¨ıve beliefs.33 Since our OLS estimate is αˆ=−0.2673 and instrumenting for price typically
makes demand more elastic (i.e., decreases αˆ) this supports our finding that current PLCB policy
operates on the right-hand side of the Laffer curve, overpricing spirits to decrease consumption.
C.5 Stockpiling
Hendel and Nevo (2006) show that static models of demand overstate own-price elasticities when
consumers hold inventories and make dynamic purchase decisions. In this study such a bias would
translate into not only poorly estimated consumer demand but also an underestimate of upstream
market power including suppliers’ ability to respond to changes in PLCB policy via η. Such a bias
would primarily show up in our estimate of the mean utility price coefficient (α), though in Appendix
C.3 above we document that less elastic estimates of consumer demand are also inconsistent with
upstream profit maximization under the observed wholesale prices.
We test for evidence of stockpiling following Pesendorfer (2002) and Hendel and Nevo (2006).
The idea is to test whether consumers are increasingly likely to buy a good the more time passes
since the last sale. In other words, if consumers can indeed make several purchases at a time when
a product is on sale, the likelihood they have to make an additional purchase increases with time
since that purchase. In Table C.VI we regress logged quantity sold (bottles) on logged price and
the duration since the last temporary sale. In the top panel, we use the product-store-period data
in our sample and include fixed effects for product, store, and period heterogeneity. If our data
exhibited a pattern of accumulation consistent with an inventory model, the coefficient on duration
from the last sale should be positive and significant. We, however, find this coefficient is small,
mostly insignificant and often negative. Further, there appears to be little evidence of stockpiling
across different product categories. We find similar results when we use the more disaggregated
daily sales data (bottom panel). We therefore conclude our data provides no evidence of stockpiling.
We do however observe unusual sales patterns in January as quantity sold falls after the holiday
season. Such behavior could be due to stockpiling, even though products are less likely to go on
sale during the holidays (see Table II), but could also be due to consumers “burning off” their
holiday inventory or adopting short-term New Year resolutions. Introducing a January indicator
could control for the change in demand caused by the latter two explanations. Being unable to
disentangle these explanations, though, we instead chose a conservative approach and dropped all
January observations from the estimation.
33The Stackelberg equilibrium in which current policy also maximizes tax revenue occurs when α=−0.2687.
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Figure D.1: Distribution of Demand Elasticities
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E Detailed Counterfactual Results
E.1 Laffer Curves and Demographics
Here, we assess differences in the Laffer curve across different consumer groups. We do so by
decomposing the aggregate Na¨ıve and “Base Response” Laffer curves of Figure 3. As in the text,
we consider alternative tax rates and, in the case of the “Base” Response equilibrium, wholesale
price responses to those tax rates that maximize aggregate distiller profit across all Pennsylvania
markets. We then consider purchase behavior under the implied retail prices in the bottom and
top quintile of markets for the pertinent demographic attributes. Lastly, we plot in Figure E.1 the
tax revenue the PLCB would realize from these purchases in the selected bottom and top markets
under varying tax rates, and indicate the tax rate that would maximize tax revenue in the select
set of markets. Results indicate that the negative trade-off between tax rate τ and tax revenues is
a common feature that affects the tax revenue collected from all demographic traits.
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Figure E.1: Laffer Curves Across Demographic Groups
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Laffer Curves by Income Groups
(a) Income
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Laffer Curves by College Groups
(b) Education
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Laffer Curves by Minority Groups
(c) Minority
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Laffer Curves by Young Groups
(d) Young
Notes: The x-axis for each graph is the PLCB ad valorem tax rate (τ) including the 18% Johnstown Flood tax. The vertical
line corresponds to the current policy. Demographic categories are defined in Section 3.4. “High” refers to markets in the top
20% while “Low” refers to markets in the bottom 20% for the corresponding demographic trait. We indicate the tax rate which
maximizes tax revenue for each demographic sub-group in parentheses.
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